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INTRODUCTION  
In the early hours of the morning on July 28, 2016, in Warren, 
Ohio, Jonathan Meadows slept on his couch as his fourteen-year-old 
daughter, Bresha Meadows, hovered over him—with his .45 caliber 
handgun in her hands.1 Pulling the trigger, Bresha fired a single 
bullet to his head.2 But the murder of her father was not a random act 
of violence.3 For years, the Meadows household had been a 
dangerous place for Bresha’s mother and her three children.4 Brandi 
                                                 
 * J.D. 2018, Michigan State University College of Law; B.S. 2014, 
Towson University.  
 1.  See John Caniglia, Bresha Meadows Case: The Fight to Keep a Young 
Girl from Prison in Dad’s Death, CLEVELAND.COM (Aug. 14, 2016), 
http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2016/08/bresha_meadows_case_the_figh
t_to_keep.html [https://perma.cc/7Y3R-6J7J]. 
 2. See Tobias Salinger, Ohio Girl Killed Father to Protect Family from 
Abuse, Mother Says, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 5, 2015), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/ohio-girl-killed-father-protect-family-
abuse-mother-article-1.2740064 [https://perma.cc/Z9R7-UEJ8]. 
 3. See id.  
 4. See John Caniglia, Bresha Meadows Case: Cleveland Detective Feared 
Helping Would Have ‘Dug Sister’s Grave’, CLEVELAND.COM, (Aug. 13, 2016), 
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Meadows, mother of Bresha Meadows, lived in fear of her husband 
as he had repeatedly beat, kicked, and punched her in front of their 
children.5 Martina Latessa, Brandi’s sister, described Jonathan 
Meadows as an overprotective and jealous man who threatened that 
if Brandi ever left him, he would kill her and their three children.6 
Although it is reported Jonathan Meadows often threatened and 
ridiculed his children, no evidence exists that the children had 
suffered any physical abuse by hand of their father.7 
Prosecutors deliberated whether to try Bresha as an adult on an 
aggravated murder charge—leaving her staring down the possibility 
of a life sentence at the age of fourteen,8 but ultimately chose to 
resolve the matter in juvenile court.9 The decision to keep Bresha’s 
case in juvenile court reflects both the media’s and her family’s 
opinion that Bresha Meadows is not a cold-blooded killer.10 Brandi 
Meadows referred to her daughter as “her hero” and stated Bresha 
                                                                                                       
http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2016/08/bresha_meadows_case_clevelan
d_detective.html [https://perma.cc/QM3U-6EKM]. Brandi’s sister, Latessa, works 
for the Cleveland police’s domestic violence unit. Id. She has not spoken with her 
sister in over five years because Jonathan kept them isolated and Brandi was too 
afraid to contact anyone “for fear Jonathan Meadows would find out.” Id. 
 5. See id. (“Any mistake or problem would, at the least, bring a form of 
mental, physical, or emotional abuse.”); see also Victoria Law, What Bresha 
Meadows, Arrested for Shooting Her Father After Reported Abuse, Faces Next, 
REWIRE (Aug. 25, 2016), https://rewire.news/article/2016/08/25/bresha-meadows-
arrested-shooting-father-reported-abuse-faces-next/ [https://perma.cc/D7BZ-
XUYK]. 
 6. See Caniglia, supra note 4. Brandi told officers that her husband was 
“capable of extreme violence” and sought to receive a civil protective order. Id. 
However, Jonathan Meadows forced her to drop it, and she agreed, fearing 
retaliation. Id. Jonathan was also very suspicious of Brandi being unfaithful and 
made sure he controlled her. Id.  
 7. See Law, supra note 5. Latessa stated that Jonathan did not hit his 
children, but “they were belittled, ridiculed, and controlled.” Id. 
 8. See Caniglia, supra note 1. Prosecutors are basing their decision to try 
Bresha in adult court based on how effectively they believe the juvenile system will 
rehabilitate her back into society. Id. 
 9. See Goldie Taylor, Bresha Meadows Isn’t a Murderer. She’s a Hero., 
DAILY BEAST (Dec. 3, 2016), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/12/03/bresha-meadows-isn-t-a-
murderer-she-s-a-hero.html [https://perma.cc/3RM4-AMZC].  
 10. See Peggy Gallek, 14-Year-Old Accused of Killing Father, Family Says 
Girl Is ‘Hero Who Saved Them All’, FOX 8 CLEVELAND (Aug. 4, 2016), 
http://fox8.com/2016/08/04/14-year-old-accused-of-killing-father-family-says-girl-
is-hero-who-saved-them-all/ [https://perma.cc/4EJB-4SHL]. About 24,000 people 
have signed a petition to have Bresha released. See Taylor, supra note 9. Many are 
finding her arrest a gross injustice. See id. 
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saved the family by doing what she never could—end the abuse.11 
Bresha’s attorney further commented this may have been “the only 
opportunity she had to defend her family and her mother.”12 Bresha 
witnessed her mother physically beaten every day, and “it reached a 
point where [her actions were] self-defense and defense of others.”13 
Although Bresha will be tried in juvenile court, this victory is not the 
end of her battle to justify shooting her father in his sleep.14 
Unfortunately, Bresha Meadows’ situation is not unique as 
there are abuse victims that experience similar realms of terror every 
day; in fact, an average of twenty people are abused by an intimate 
partner or family member every minute.15 Often when the abuse 
ultimately ends at the hands of the victim, the state pursues criminal 
charges against the victim acting in self-defense.16 Although Bresha’s 
situation suggests a more difficult circumstance of defending 
another, the criminal justice system has consistently failed other 
victims of direct abuse, as courts have refused or limited evidence of 
their abuse at trial,17 and even with legislative amendments to self-
defense law, presenting a self-defense claim cannot guarantee an 
acquittal.18 
Failures in conviction methods and sentencing procedures 
result in long-term incarceration that only perpetuates the adversity 
of those ultimately acting to protect themselves.19 On average, 
                                                 
 11. See Gallek, supra note 10. 
 12. See Salinger, supra note 2. 
 13. See id. 
 14. See Taylor, supra note 9. 
 15. See Domestic Violence National Statistics, NAT’L COALITION AGAINST 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, https://www.speakcdn.com/assets/2497/domestic_violence.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CQ7N-TWLL] (last visited May 7, 2018). 
 16. See Ashley Brosius, An Iowa Law in Need of Imminent Change: 
Redefining the Temporal Proximity of Force to Account for Victims of Intimate 
Partner Violence Who Kill in Non-Confrontational Self-Defense, 100 IOWA L. REV. 
775, 775-79 (2015). Brosius’s comment describes a similar situation, in which a 
woman kills her husband in a nonconfrontational setting after years of violent abuse. 
Id. at 777. The jury convicted the woman of second-degree murder for failing to 
present a perfect self-defense claim that demonstrated that the woman was placed in 
a situation of imminent harm to justify the killing of her abuser. Id. at 778-79. 
 17. See, e.g., Wallace-Bey v. State, 172 A.3d 1006, 1041 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 2017) (finding that the court erred by limiting certain evidence of past abuse). 
 18. See Kit Kinports, So Much Activity, So Little Change: A Reply to the 
Critics of Battered Women’s Self-Defense, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 155, 157, 
161-62 (2004). 
 19. See Elizabeth L. Turk, Abuses and Syndromes: Excuses or 
Justifications?, 18 WHITTIER L. REV. 901, 901-92 (1997); see also Brian J. Ostrom 
et al., Assessing Consistency and Fairness in Sentencing: A Comparative Study in 
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women who kill their abusive partners receive a fifteen-year 
sentence.20 Often women resort to this “last-gasp” effort because they 
neither have the financial means to leave nor do they have a 
beneficial relationship with the police that would encourage them to 
seek help.21 According to a California statistic, 93% of women who 
committed homicide had been abused by the victim and 67% of 
women committed the homicide in self-defense.22 Although the state 
has a legitimate interest in incarcerating those who kill, it is critical 
that courts strike a balance between the interests of the state and the 
interests of suffering abuse victims.23  
To remedy these inadequacies, the criminal justice system 
should reform how it approaches the prosecution and sentencing of 
victims who kill their abusers.24 A better and likely more successful 
approach would be to reform sentencing guidelines to strongly 
incorporate rehabilitative practices in lieu of strict incarceration to 
combat inadequate conviction methods and overcome the influence 
of the more dominant sentencing theories.25 As scientific 
developments have emerged over the past several decades, 
rehabilitation has reformed into a new model influenced by scientific 
research data from various disciplines such as neuroscience, 
pharmaceuticals, and behavioral science.26 These advances in 
medicine, neuroscience, pharmacology, and behavioral therapies 
provide the new rehabilitation model with effective tools to treat 
                                                                                                       
Three States, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS. 1 (2006) [hereinafter Comparative Study], 
http://www.vcsc.virginia.gov/PEWExecutiveSummaryv10.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
JZF7-5JU5]. 
 20. See Mich. Women’s Justice & Clemency Project, Clemency for Battered 
Women in Michigan: A Manual for Attorneys, LAW STUDENTS & SOC. WORKERS 1 
(2008) [hereinafter Clemency Project], http://umich.edu/~clemency/ 
clemency_mnl/ch1.html [https://perma.cc/N95A-P6DC] (stating that women who 
kill their intimate partners receive an average sentence of fifteen years); see also 
Susan C. Smith, Abused Children Who Kill Abusive Parents: Moving Toward an 
Appropriate Legal Response, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 141, 169 (1992) (“In parricide 
cases, while sentences range from no punishment at all to life in prison, the average 
sentence is approximately fifteen to twenty years imprisonment.”); Rebecca 
McCray, When Battered Women Are Punished with Prison, TAKEPART (Sept. 24, 
2015), http://www.takepart.com/article/2015/09/24/battered-women-prison [https:// 
perma.cc/4A36-UWJG]. 
 21. See McCray, supra note 20.  
 22. See The Sin by Silence Bills, AB 593 (2012), 
http://legislation.sinbysilence.com/about-ab-593 [https://perma.cc/K7SZ-HZPB].  
 23. See infra Part III. 
 24. See infra Part III. 
 25. See infra Part III. 
 26. See infra Subsection II.B.1.a. 
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offending abuse victims and restore them to a more stable state of 
being.27 This new model not only brings the necessary help to abuse 
victims, but also encourages judges to abandon past sentencing 
guidelines that primarily focus on retributivist efforts and instead 
consider the individual offender.28 With the new rehabilitation model 
at the judiciary’s disposal, incarceration becomes not only 
inappropriate, but cruel.29  
Part I of this Note discusses the current problems abuse victims 
who kill their abusers face within the legal system and explains the 
inadequacies of the trial system, as it often fails to protect abuse 
victims from incarceration.30 Part II examines the penal philosophies 
encompassed within the current federal and state sentencing 
guidelines and not only analyzes their flaws, but also the movement 
toward an evidence-based system, further supporting rehabilitation’s 
revival.31 Finally, Part III argues that the new rehabilitation model is 
the best alternative for abuse victims who kill their abusers in self-
defense and do not receive an acquittal.32 This section urges the 
criminal justice system to consider the individual offender and the 
totality of the circumstances surrounding the crime, including the 
circumstances influencing the mental state of the offending abuse 
victim.33 By considering the individual offender, the system itself can 
institute a reform more cognizant of and sensitive to the mental, 
emotional, and physical effects of abuse, therefore shifting the focus 
of sentencing from punishment to treatment.34 This section further 
addresses the benefits and criticisms of using the new rehabilitation 
model as a solution.35 This Note ultimately concludes by arguing that 
the benefits of implementing a rehabilitative focus in sentencing 
guidelines for abuse victims outweigh any criticism to altering the 
system.36 
                                                 
 27. See infra Subsection III.C.2.  
 28. See infra Part III.  
 29. See infra Subsection III.C.2. 
 30. See infra Part I.  
 31. See infra Part II.  
 32. See infra Part III.  
 33. See infra Part III. 
 34. See infra Section III.C.  
 35. See infra Subsection III.C.3. 
 36. See infra Subsection III.C.3.  
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I. AVOIDING THE CONVICTION: EXAMINING THE FAILURES OF THE 
TRIAL SYSTEM 
Historically, abuse victims, namely women, who killed their 
abusers in nonconfrontational settings have not had an arsenal of 
legal defenses or excuses at their disposal.37 In many cases, victims 
of repeated physical violence have struggled to properly exculpate 
their actions when claiming self-defense or defense of others.38 Such 
obstacles often arise in trying to satisfy the law’s requirements in 
both the prima facie claim of self-defense and the rules of evidence 
in criminal trials.39  
A. Evaluating the Inadequacy of Self-Defense for Abuse Victims  
Although some jurisdictions have successfully enacted legal 
reforms to help abuse victims claim self-defense or defense of others, 
the lack of uniformity among states substantially prejudices 
offending abuse victims who can claim self-defense in one state but 
not another.40 This disparity commonly occurs in cases where the 
abuse victim subjectively perceives an imminent threat of harm, but 
the killing occurs as the abuser is sleeping or engaged in a 
nonconfrontational course of action.41 Even though the abuse victim 
                                                 
 37. See Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a 
Historical Accident on Behalf of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 11, 
13-17 (1986). Rosen discusses the development of defenses for abuse victims, 
particularly for battered women. See id. Women in abusive situations often resorted 
to self-help methods, leading to the killing of their abusers, and such methods also 
led to murder convictions since defenses did not previously exist for these types of 
nonconfrontational situations. See id. at 13-14. 
 38. See Jeffrey B. Murdoch, Is Imminence Really Necessity? Reconciling 
Traditional Self-Defense Doctrine with the Battered Woman Syndrome, 20 N. ILL. U. 
L. REV. 191, 192-93 (2000) (discussing how many courts have refused to allow a 
self-defense jury instruction when the homicide occurred in a nonconfrontational 
manner).  
 39. See id. at 203-05 (discussing how abuse victims have struggled to both 
establish the imminence requirement and admit their evidence of abuse to further 
establish imminence); see also Turk, supra note 19, at 909-10.  
 40. See Martin E. Veinsreideris, The Prospective Effects of Modifying 
Existing Law to Accommodate Preemptive Self-Defense by Battered Women, 149 U. 
PA. L. REV. 613, 616-17 (2000) (discussing the differences in state statutes that treat 
the self-defense immediacy requirement as either imminent or immediately 
necessary and how one over the other can be more outcome determinative).  
 41. See Kit Kinports, Defending Battered Women’s Self-Defense Claims, 67 
OR. L. REV. 393, 394 (1988); see also Joan H. Krause, Distorted Reflections of 
Battered Women Who Kill: A Response to Professor Dressler, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
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has a belief that bodily harm or death will immediately occur, such 
belief has been traditionally insufficient to satisfy the minimal 
requisite of an objective threat of bodily harm or death.42 Therefore, 
without the immediate physical threat, the abuse victim fails to 
present a successful self-defense claim.43 Although courts have been 
increasingly willing to admit the mitigating evidence of abuse 
syndromes, this movement often fails to overcome the deficiency in 
self-defense to provide for all circumstances of self-preservation.44  
1. The Elements of Self-Defense and Disparaging Effects  
Self-defense legally justifies the killing of another human being 
in limited and exceptional circumstances.45 To claim self-defense, a 
person must validate the use of force by satisfying various elements. 
First, the actor must reasonably believe there is a threat of unlawful 
harm.46 Second, the amount of force must be proportional to the 
threatened force.47 Third, the actor must believe that use of force is 
necessary to prevent the unlawful harm.48 Finally, the threatened 
harm must be immediate or imminent.49 Most importantly, aside 
from having a good-faith belief of harm, the belief must be 
                                                                                                       
555, 558 (2007). Krause states that “in nonconfrontational circumstances, the chief 
obstacles to proving self-defense are the requirements that she reasonably believe 
the threatened harm be imminent, as the killing occurs in the absence of any ongoing 
physical attack.” Id. 
 42. See Krause, supra note 41, at 557 (“This belief must be both 
subjectively reasonable, in that the actor herself truly believes it, and objectively 
reasonable, in that a reasonable person would similarly so believe.”).  
 43. See Joshua Dressler, Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers: Some 
Reflections, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 457, 460-61 (2006) (asserting that no self-defense 
claim can take place during a nonconfrontational event). 
 44. See Alafair S. Burke, Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and Duress: 
Making Sense, Not Syndromes, Out of the Battered Woman, 81 N.C. L. REV. 211, 
218 (2002).  
 45. See Rosen, supra note 37, at 25. 
 46. See United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1229-30 (D.C. Cir. 1973).  
 47. See id. at 1229 (implying that the self-defense must be reasonable under 
the circumstances, such that if the attacker was to “maim,” the appropriate self-
defense response would not be to kill).  
 48. See id. at 1230 (discussing that the threat must be actually immediate 
and that “[t]he defender must have believed that he was in imminent peril of death 
or serious bodily harm”).  
 49. See id. at 1229. Judge Robinson, delivering the opinion of the court, 
discusses that the killing must have been done out of total necessity. Id. Judge 
Robinson states that successful self-defense claims require that “[t]here must have 
been a threat, actual or apparent, of the use of deadly force against the defender.” Id.  
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“objectively reasonable in light of the circumstances.”50 For abuse 
victims claiming self-defense based on a nonconfrontational killing, 
the imminence requirement presents a difficult standard to satisfy 
because such victims must be presented with an objectively 
immediate threat of harm.51 Scholars have developed multiple 
theories that would allow abuse victims to overcome the imminence 
requirement; however, not every state accepts such theories as some 
choose to follow a stringent application of self-defense.52  
For abuse victims, the cyclical nature of the physical harm 
creates a perception of constant physical danger; therefore, it may 
seem reasonable for abuse victims to kill their abusers in 
nonconfrontational settings.53 However, self-defense struggles to 
universally incorporate this reasoning.54 What bars abuse victims 
from claiming self-defense or defense of others is the subjective and 
objective reasonableness requirement—in which the person must 
have had an honest belief of imminent harm and the jury must 
determine that a reasonable person would perceive that the 
assailant’s action would result in serious harm or death.55  
Even the minority jurisdictions following the Model Penal 
Code’s (MPC) version of self-protection—which requires only a 
                                                 
 50. See People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 50 (N.Y. 1986) (“To completely 
exonerate such an individual, no matter how aberrational or bizarre his thought 
patterns, would allow citizens to set their own standards for the permissible use of 
force.”). 
 51. See Rosen, supra note 37, at 33-34; see also Anne M. Coughlin, 
Excusing Women, 82 CALIF. L. REV 1, 49 (1994) (“Defenders of battered women 
found that jurors were hostile to the women’s self-defense pleas, especially in the 
nonconfrontational cases.”).  
 52. See Kinports, supra note 41, at 423; see also Robert F. Schopp, Barbara 
J. Surgis & Megan Sullivan, Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony, and the 
Distinction Between Justification and Excuse, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 45, 66 
(discussing the nuanced difference between statutes that require immediate harm 
versus imminence). The Schopp article suggests that developing a temporal 
distinction between the two words will allow more women to claim that they were in 
some form of pending danger justifying their actions. See id. at 66-67. 
 53. See Kinports, supra note 41, at 409 (“Because these cases do not 
resemble the classic case of self-defense, this lack of success is not surprising.”). 
 54. See id. 
 55. See id. at 409-15 (“[T]he two approaches do not constitute diametrically 
opposed standards[,] . . . they represent different points on a continuum, with the 
only arguable difference lying in the extent to which they import the defendant’s 
particular characteristics into the definition of the ‘reasonable person.’”); see also 
State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 364, 375 (N.J. 1984) (presenting one of the first cases 
in which courts considered battered women’s syndrome as relevant to “defendant’s 
belief that she was in imminent danger”).  
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showing of actual belief of harm—do not guarantee that an abuse 
victim who kills her abuser nonconfrontationally will receive a total 
defense.56 First, under the MPC, honest belief, which applies to co-
dwellers, can be undermined by the retreat requirement.57 This poses 
an obstacle for the abuse victim claiming self-defense during a 
nonconfrontational circumstance because she is obligated to avoid 
using force.58 Second, courts within MPC jurisdictions may often 
instruct the jury to find whether a reasonable person under the same 
or similar circumstances would also determine that the killing was 
necessary to prevent harm or death.59 Therefore, MPC states are not 
always “purely subjective” because a jury can be instructed to 
consider objective reasonableness when justifying the actions of the 
offending victim.60  
2. Battered Woman Syndrome: Achieving Perfect or Imperfect 
Self-Defense  
Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS), also referred to as Battered 
Person Syndrome (BPS), alone is not a recognized legal defense.61 It 
                                                 
 56. See Kinports, supra note 41, at 409; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 
3.04(1) (“[T]he use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the 
actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting 
himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present 
occasion.”).  
 57. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(ii) (“The use of deadly force is not 
justifiable . . . if the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force 
with complete safety by retreating.”).  
 58. See Hava Dayan & Emanuel Gross, Between the Hammer and the 
Anvil: Battered Women Claiming Self-Defense and a Legislative Proposal to Amend 
Section 3.04(2)(b) of the U.S. Model Penal Code, 52 HARV. J. LEGIS. 17, 28-29 
(2015) (discussing the obstacles a battered woman faces in claiming self-defense 
under the Model Penal Code).  
 59. See Kinports, supra note 41, at 410-11 (“The jurisdictions that purport 
to apply an entirely subjective standard of self-defense use a similar instruction [of 
whether a reasonable person would have felt the need to use self-defense under the 
same circumstances]: in order to acquit on grounds of self-defense, the trier of fact 
must find that a reasonable person in the same situation, seeing what the defendant 
saw and knowing what she knew, would have resorted to self-defense.”).  
 60. See id. Kinports describes the MPC standard as “not purely subjective; 
rather, it also incorporates the objective notion of ‘reasonableness.’” Id. at 410. 
 61. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-21(d)(1)-(2) (2010) (“In a prosecution for 
murder or manslaughter, if a defendant raises as a defense . . . the defendant, in 
order to establish the defendant’s reasonable belief that the use of force or deadly 
force was immediately necessary, may be permitted to offer: (1) Relevant evidence 
that the defendant had been the victim of acts of family violence or child abuse 
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functions as a supplement to the imminence requirement by allowing 
an abuse victim to claim that he or she acted reasonably in response 
to what he or she perceived to be an immediate threat of harm, even 
when the threat would not exist otherwise.62 BWS, therefore, acts as 
a quasi-defense in murder or manslaughter cases where the defendant 
has been repeatedly subjected to prolonged abuse.63 In order to 
achieve a successful self-defense claim, the abuse victim must 
present expert testimony establishing that the act was reasonable 
under the surrounding circumstances—a feat that Battered Woman 
Syndrome does not guarantee.64 Abuse victims claiming self-defense 
may use BWS testimony to achieve imperfect or perfect self-
defense.65 Unlike perfect self-defense, which functions as a total 
defense and would acquit the defendant of a crime, imperfect self-
defense reduces a charge from murder to manslaughter.66 Imperfect 
self-defense only requires a showing of an honest but unreasonable 
belief that imminent peril to life or great bodily injury will occur.67 
This is largely a subjective standard and requires no finding of 
objective reasonableness.68 In turn, perfect self-defense requires a 
showing that the belief is objectively reasonable, in addition to the 
actual subjective belief that harm will occur.69 Moreover, issues in 
offering BWS testimony can arise when courts err in providing a 
BWS instruction to the jury, resulting in improper application of 
                                                                                                       
committed by the deceased . . . ; and (2) [r]elevant expert testimony regarding the 
condition of the mind of the defendant at the time of the offense.”).  
 62. See 34 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § 4 (1983).  
 63. See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 55-79 (1979). Lenore 
Walker developed the BWS theory in the 1970’s. Id. at 55-70; see also Mira 
Mihajlovich, Comment, Does Plight Make Right: The Battered Woman Syndrome, 
Expert Testimony and the Law of Self-Defense, 62 IND. L.J. 1253, 1257-59 (1987). 
The syndrome acts as a quasi-exception to traditional elements of self-defense 
because it relies on expert testimony on the syndrome and self-defense claims to 
create a legitimate legal defense. Id. at 1259. 
 64. See Burke, supra note 44, at 230-31, 243 (“Even if the defendant 
convinces a jury that she reasonably believed that harm was imminent, the jury may 
be reluctant to acquit.”).  
 65. See Christopher Slobogin, Psychological Syndromes and Criminal 
Responsibility, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 109, 112 (2010).  
 66. See id. (“Traditionally, imperfect self-defense might apply when a 
person honestly but unreasonably believed he or she was about to be seriously 
harmed or killed by the victim or when the crime is objectively disproportionate to 
the harm but nonetheless is understandable.”).  
 67. See Wallace-Bey v. State, 172 A.3d 1006, 1023-24 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
2017).  
 68. See McNeil v. Middleton, 402 F.3d 920, 921 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 69. See Wallace-Bey, 234 A.3d at 1023.  
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BWS to imperfect or perfect self-defense, or when the BWS 
evidence is limited to the extent it impacts the jury’s finding of fact.70  
Consider the case of Middleton v. McNeil, in which the 
Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision to issue a writ 
of habeas corpus for a woman convicted of second-degree murder 
for shooting her husband in both the head and the stomach while he 
was cooking.71 The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the trial judge 
improperly instructed the jury by prohibiting its application of BWS 
testimony to perfect self-defense.72 The Ninth Circuit held this was in 
error because if the jury had followed the literal interpretation of the 
instruction, it could have established the defendant did not act as a 
reasonable person and, therefore, rejected the imperfect self-defense 
argument altogether.73 However, the Supreme Court disagreed.74 The 
Supreme Court stated the jury did not possess the legal sophistication 
to parse such technicalities; thus, the instruction would have unlikely 
misled the jury.75 On remand, a Ninth Circuit dissenting judge 
suggested that not only did the defendant heavily rely on BWS 
evidence for her defense, but the trial court erroneously deprived the 
defendant of due process through the limited instruction, which 
“precluded [the defendant] from establishing the reasonableness of 
her belief” and further deprived her of the chance to justify her 
actions with a complete defense.76 The judge further wrote that 
                                                 
 70. See McNeil v. Middleton, 402 F.3d 920, 922 (9th Cir. 2005); Wallace-
Bey, 234 A.3d. at 1006.  
 71. See Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004) (per curium) 
(stating that the last four words of the jury instruction—as a reasonable person—
should not have been included in the jury instruction but were unlikely “to have 
mislead the jury”).  
 72. See McNeil, 402 F.3d at 921 (“The trial judge correctly instructed the 
jury that BWS could be considered on the issue of McNeil’s actual belief, but 
incorrectly instructed that it could not be considered in testing reasonableness for 
perfect self-defense purposes.”).  
 73. See id. (“Thus, even though BWS evidence could be considered, it did 
her little good because if, due to BWS, her perceptions were other than that of a 
reasonable person, she could not demonstrate that her actions resulted in voluntary 
manslaughter at most.”).  
 74. See Middleton, 541 U.S. at 437-38.  
 75. See id. at 438.  
 76. McNeil, 402 F.3d at 923 (Paez, J., dissenting). Judge Paez dissented in 
the opinion and concluded that the defendant had a due process right to present a 
complete defense. Id. Her defense could not be properly established without 
presenting evidence of BWS, and mostly importantly, it was her only defense. Id. 
Judge Paez found the jury instruction was not a harmless error because she needed 
to show her belief of imminent harm was both “actual and reasonable.” Id. 
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although the jury considered evidence of BWS, it did little to serve 
the abuse victim when the court erroneously instructed the jury.77  
The case of Wallace-Bey v. State presents a similarly alarming 
issue with admitting BWS evidence to achieve perfect or imperfect 
self-defense.78 In 2009, a jury convicted Tania Wallace-Bey of first-
degree premeditated murder and sentenced her to life imprisonment 
plus twenty years.79 The defendant shot her boyfriend in the chest 
after he had reportedly raped her.80 She told her defense counsel that 
she had been repeatedly abused months before, but counsel did not 
pursue this information in her defense.81 After the appellate court 
affirmed her conviction, she filed for post-conviction relief on the 
basis of ineffective assistance of counsel,82 and during a new trial in 
2016, the jury convicted her once more.83  
During the March 2016 trial, the court sustained the 
prosecutor’s multiple objections to the defense’s statements 
regarding her boyfriend’s psychologically abusive remarks during 
their relationship.84 Thus, the trial court limited the testimony that the 
jury could hear regarding the defendant’s overall mental state and 
                                                 
 77. See id. at 924 (“Because the centerpiece of [the defendant’s] defense 
was the BWS evidence, the erroneous instruction effectively precluded the jury from 
finding that she acted in self-defense when she shot and killed [the victim].”).  
 78. See Wallace-Bey v. State, 172 A.3d 1006 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2017).  
 79. See id. at 1011. 
 80. See id. 
 81. See id. at 1011-12. The Maryland Special Court of Appeals stated that 
the defense counsel did not pursue any battered woman syndrome evaluation and 
merely relied on a “theory of self-defense, without calling any witnesses.” Id. The 
court affirmed her convictions on direct appeal. Id. The defendant also wrote a note 
addressing the abuse to her family. Id. at 1013. The note stated that “‘over the past 
year,’ her relationship with [the victim] ‘became very unhealthy.’” Id. She made 
“‘numerous attempts to end the relationship,’ but that they ‘managed to find 
themselves in each other’s arms—only to begin a new cycle of sickness and injury 
more grotesque than previous.’ She said that there ‘appeared to be no hope in sight 
for their condition,’ that she ‘couldn’t see the way out,’ and that she ‘couldn’t take it 
anymore.’” Id.  
 82. See id. at 1012 (“The post-conviction court found that [the defendant’s] 
trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate battered 
spouse syndrome. . . . On March 13, 2014, the court vacated [the defendant’s] 
convictions and granted her a new trial.”).  
 83. See id. at 1011. 
 84. See id. at 1012 (“For instance, the court sustained an objection to a 
comment that [her boyfriend] demeaned [the defendant] by telling her that she was 
‘sick’ and ‘destined for stagnation and failure.’”). 
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scaled down the full picture of the defendant’s abuse.85 Although the 
court allowed an expert to testify that the defendant suffered from 
BWS, the expert could not adequately discuss any effects of 
psychological abuse on the defendant that involved her boyfriend’s 
controlling behavior.86 At the end of the trial, the court instructed the 
jury on how to apply imperfect or perfect self-defense and declined 
to give a special instruction regarding battered spouse syndrome.87 
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals found that exclusion of the 
victim’s statements to the defendant severely impaired the 
defendant’s imperfect self-defense claim by limiting the jury’s 
understanding of how the abuse affected her mental state when she 
killed her boyfriend.88 The Special Court of Appeals held that she 
will be entitled to a new trial, yet again.89  
B. Admissibility of Past Abuse During Criminal Trial 
In further contributing to the complications of claiming self-
defense, admission of syndrome evidence has also posed a 
substantial obstacle for abuse victims in the past.90 Using BWS 
evidence to claim imperfect self-defense cannot reasonably succeed 
                                                 
 85. See id. at 1013 (“[A]ccording to defense counsel, the jury would ‘not be 
able to adequately evaluate’ whether and how the abuse actually occurred.”). At 
another point during the trial, the prosecutor asked the defendant why she did not 
leave on an occasion of abuse. See id. The defendant replied, “Because I’m barred 
from saying what he said, I will say that he said things to me that led me to believe 
that he would harm me if I moved.” Id. at 1020. 
 86. See id. at 1021 (“The court sustained four more objections while Dr. 
McGraw attempted to describe psychological abuse in the form of [the victim’s] 
controlling behavior, in which he ‘insisted’ that she do certain things and ‘claimed’ 
that he was ‘divinely ordained’ or ‘the police of God.’”). The trial court determined 
that these types of statements were inadmissible hearsay. See id.  
 87. See id. at 1022. 
 88. See id. at 1032 (stating that “[t]he jury heard a muted version of the 
defense case instead of the version that [the defendant] had the right to present under 
Maryland law”).  
 89. See id. at 1041. 
 90. See Turk, supra note 19, at 904. Historically, courts have battled over 
whether the appropriate standards for admissibility of scientific evidence should be 
conducted under the Frye test (which requires a general consensus among experts in 
a field) or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure § 702. See id. But since Daubert, the 
treatment of scientific evidence opened the door for abuse syndromes. See id. The 
Court in Daubert rejected the Frye test and “opened the door for admissibility of 
novel scientific evidence, such as expert testimony to prove the existence of many 
syndromes not scientifically recognized by the entire psychiatric community.” Id. at 
905. 
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if evidence of the abuse is negated during trial.91 According to 
Professor Slobogin, psychological syndromes only make a difference 
in criminal trials when “they are thought to be an admissible basis 
for expert opinion.”92 The testimony of the expert must be based on 
“scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.”93 Unless the 
evidence of abuse comports with rules of evidence, abuse victims are 
prohibited from claiming any of the established syndromes—whether 
Battered Woman Syndrome or Battered Child Syndrome.94  
1. Rules for the Admission of Past Abuse  
Evidence of past abuse may be used to prove that the defendant 
acted reasonably in the absence of an actual threat.95 In order to 
admit testimony of past abuse during trial, the evidence must be 
weighed under four distinct criteria: materiality, probative value, 
helpfulness, and prejudicial impact.96 In the past, syndrome evidence 
or abuse testimony had failed to overcome the materiality 
requirement because self-defense ignores the “special sensitivities” 
of the defendant, therefore hindering the consideration of the 
defendant’s psychological impact from the prolonged abuse.97 
                                                 
 91. See generally Erich D. Anderson & Ann Read-Anderson, Constitutional 
Dimensions of the Battered Woman Syndrome, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 363, 403 (1992) 
(asserting that expert testimony is necessary to the defendant’s constitutional right to 
present a defense); see also Victoria M. Mather, The Skeleton in the Closet: The 
Battered Woman Syndrome, Self-Defense, and Expert Testimony, 39 MERCER L. 
REV. 545, 574-83 (1988) (arguing the expert testimony is necessary for the jury to 
understand a battered woman’s self-defense claim).  
 92. Slobogin, supra note 65, at 110.  
 93. FED. R. EVID. 702.  
 94. See Slobogin, supra note 65, at 110.  
 95. See Rosen, supra note 37, at 41. Rosen states that the testimony of the 
woman may help explain why she chose to stay with her abuser, thus shedding light 
on the events leading to her situation. See id. The testimony allows the woman to 
explain herself as a victim, instead of a cold-blooded killer. See id. Absent this 
testimony, the jury would lack an understanding of the totality of the circumstances. 
See id.  
 96. See Slobogin, supra note 65, at 110. Materiality refers to “the logical 
relationship between the syndrome testimony and substantive criminal law 
doctrine.” Id. Probative value means “the reliability/validity of the syndrome 
evidence.” Id. Helpfulness is the “extent to which the evidence adds to the fact 
finder’s knowledge.” Id. Prejudicial impact refers to the “extent to which the expert 
testimony will be misused by or distract the fact finder.” Id.  
 97. See id. at 111 (“[S]ome advocates have suggested that a battered woman 
is highly attuned to the batterer’s tendencies and thus is much better than the 
reasonable person at determining when the batterer’s violence will escalate to the 
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Assessing the probative value of syndrome testimony means 
measuring relevance through the likelihood that self-defense was 
required, and most jurisdictions acknowledge admitting BWS or 
other psychological syndromes on an empirical basis is necessary to 
establish that fact.98 Although not all evidence aids the fact finder’s 
decision, evidence of a syndrome can be helpful in providing an 
explanation for the abuse victim choosing to remain with the abuser; 
however, a common argument is that this evidence only supports the 
offending abuse victim’s testimony.99 Therefore, evidence of 
psychological syndromes may pass some requirements of evidence, 
but the evidence may nonetheless be rejected for prejudicing or 
distracting the jury.100  
2. Problems Associated with Expert Testimony  
Since the emergence of psychological syndromes, legal 
scholars have failed to reach a consensus in determining the 
relevancy of BWS evidence alleged in self-defense claims.101 The 
1980s highlighted this debate, as courts grappled over the 
admissibility of BWS evidence in criminal trials, resulting in 
numerous decision splits among states.102 In order for an abuse victim 
                                                                                                       
point that serious bodily injury or death is likely. But, again, the traditional self-
defense rule does not take into account special sensitivities of the defendant.”). 
 98. See id. at 113 (discussing that admission of expert testimony evidence 
depends on jurisdiction and how those that follow the Daubert standard require 
more than general acceptance within the professional community to allow the 
testimony due to the methodological problems that arise, such as “obtaining control 
groups, selection bias with respect to the samples studied, and difficulty in gauging 
the motivation for not leaving or for attacking the batterer”).  
 99. See id. at 114 (“[O]ne might argue that BWS testimony should not be 
admissible because it merely seconds the battered woman’s testimony.”).  
 100. See id. at 115 (detailing that such evidence may “paint . . . such a 
sympathetic picture of the woman that the jury will acquit simply because it feels 
sorry for the victim”).  
 101. Compare Mihajlovich, supra note 63, at 1263 (discussing that abuse 
testimony should be inadmissible because it is “subject matter not beyond the ken of 
the average juror”), with Mathew Fine, Comment, Hear Me Now: The Admission of 
Expert Testimony on Battered Women’s Syndrome—An Evidentiary Approach, 20 
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 221, 238-42 (2013) (offering a solution to amend the 
Federal Rules of Evidence in a manner that would create uniformity across 
jurisdictions in the allowance of BWS testimony).  
 102. See Mather, supra note 91, at 575. Compare State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d. 
364, 377 (N.J. 1984) (finding the expert testimony relevant to the defendant’s belief 
she was imminent danger), with Commonwealth v. Grove, 526 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. 
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to succeed in presenting BWS evidence, expert testimony must 
validate the claim.103 Expert testimony aids the fact finder by 
providing a scientific explanation for the both the psychological 
effects of violence and the abuse victim’s conditioned response to 
such violence.104 According to Professor Mather, the debate in 
admitting expert testimony arose from factors such as “general 
acceptance [of BWS] within the scientific community; relevance of 
such testimony; whether the syndrome is beyond the understanding 
of the average juror; and the possible prejudicial impact of the 
testimony.”105  
States have overcome some of these issues by increasingly 
allowing expert testimony to credit evidence of abuse, but the 
problems associated with expert testimony have not dwindled 
entirely.106 Currently, expert testimony of BWS for a woman who 
kills her abuser in a nonconfrontational setting is accepted by fewer 
than one-third of the states.107 Although expert testimony of BWS in 
confrontational settings is generally accepted, most states do not 
allow an expert to comment on whether the abuse victim acted under 
a reasonable belief of imminent harm, which presents one of the 
many limitations on expert testimony.108  
Limitations of expert testimony frequently occur in states that 
strictly require an objective standard for self-defense claims.109 
                                                                                                       
Super. Ct. 1987) (finding that the trial court properly excluded testimony of the 
defendant’s past abuse by the victim).  
 103. See Mather, supra note 91, at 574 (“Expert evidence is often crucial to a 
battered woman’s claim of self-defense because . . . society widely subscribes to the 
myths surrounding the abusive relationship.”).  
 104. U.S. DEP’T JUST., VALIDITY AND USE OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING 
BATTERING AND ITS EFFECTS IN CRIMINAL TRIAL: REPORT RESPONDING TO SECTION 
40507 OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT (1996). 
 105. See Mather, supra note 91, at 574. Often the prosecutor would object to 
the expert testimony and claim such testimony prejudices the victim by marking him 
an abuser. Id. at 585.  
 106. See Joan H. Krause, Of Merciful Justice and Justified Mercy: 
Commuting the Sentences of Battered Women Who Kill, 46 FLA. L. REV. 699, 715-
16 (1994). 
 107. Clemency Project, supra note 20, at 5.  
 108. See id.; see also Bruce Ching, Mirandizing Terrorism Suspects? The 
Public Safety Exception, the Rescue Doctrine, and Implicit Analogies to Self-
Defense, Defense of Others, and Battered Woman Syndrome, 64 CATH. U. L. REV. 
613, 625 (2015).  
 109. See Slobogin, supra note 65, at 122-23 (“Testimony about BWS is not 
material in those jurisdictions that take an objective approach to self-defense and 
provocation and that do not recognize a nonpsychotic disorder as a mental disease or 
defect for insanity purposes.”).  
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Expert testimony must comply with the state’s substantive law 
regarding the rules of evidence.110 These states may decide that the 
BWS testimony is immaterial to the defendant’s case because the 
subjective component of the defendant’s actions is absent from the 
law.111 Moreover, the possibility of prejudicial impact of BWS 
testimony presents another obstacle for abuse victims.112 BWS 
testimony may be excluded for “fear it will confuse the jury or 
distract the jury from the issue toward which the evidence is 
directed.”113  
Although the doctrine of self-defense has made significant 
strides in permitting evidence of abuse syndromes as mitigating 
evidence, and courts have also improved by admitting syndrome 
testimony, there is still disagreement among states in how to proceed 
in such cases, and juries may still render guilty verdicts regardless of 
the evidence presented.114 Unfortunately, judicial failures often result 
in harsh sentences for abuse victims.115 And just as the trial system 
has often failed abuse victims, the sentencing theories embedded in 
the judicial sentencing guidelines also fail in providing appropriate 
sentencing.116  
II. SENTENCING THEORIES, THE NEW REHABILITATION MODEL, AND 
ABUSE VICTIMS 
Exploring why society requires an institution of punishment 
helps frame where abuse victims who kill their abusers fit within the 
legal system.117 Society has long used punishment to express disdain 
                                                 
 110. See id. (stating that expert testimony rules vary among states and can 
vastly change the outcome).  
 111. See id. (discussing the possibility of certain jurisdictions determining 
this of testimony as irrelevant). 
 112. See id. at 115 (“One concern about defense-introduced BWS testimony 
. . . is that the evidence will paint such an ugly picture of the batterer and such a 
sympathetic picture of the woman that the jury will acquit simply because it feels 
sorry for the victim, even though the killing was a disproportionate response to the 
threat.”). 
 113. See id. at 114.  
 114. See id. at 112 (discussing how jurisdictions have permitted evidence 
about BWS).  
 115. See Clemency Project, supra note 20, at 3 (discussing that more than 
2,000 women are in prison from killing their abusive partners).  
 116. See infra Subsection II.A.2 (discussing the inadequacies of current 
sentencing guidelines).  
 117. See Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND 
JUSTICE 1282-84 (Joshua Dressler ed., 2002). Greenawalt further describes two other 
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or condemnation for undesirable behavior.118 Since human beings 
have fostered civilization, punishment has endured as a fundamental 
social custom.119 The early civilizations originally implemented 
punishment through primitive and barbaric methods of torture, but 
by the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, European philosophers 
and law makers refined punishment as a sophisticated correcting 
tool.120 Punishment was viewed as both deserved and as a behavioral 
deterrent.121  
As these notions of crime and punishment trickled from Europe 
to America, the developing American criminal system was instilled 
with similar sentiments toward society and punishment.122 The 
American Revolution initially shifted those sentiments toward more 
rehabilitative practices and sought to use punishment as a remedy to 
cure the criminal, but the rehabilitative model did not survive the 
modern sentencing reform.123 During the reform, the previous 
conceptions of just deserts and deterrence manifested into two 
dominant competing theories that govern the current American legal 
system—retributivism and utilitarianism.124 These two theories 
suggest that criminal penalties are justified because either (1) the 
                                                                                                       
questions that may be asked in determining whether punishment is justifiable: (1) 
What are the “necessary conditions for criminal liability and punishment,” and (2) 
what is the appropriate “form and severity of punishment” as it relates to the offense 
committed? Id. at 1282.  
 118. See A. Warren Stearns, Evolution of Punishment, 27 J. AM. INST. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 219, 220 (1936) (discussing how society’s origin of punishment 
developed out of expressing irritation toward individuals who failed to conform to 
norms and patterns). 
 119. See id. at 219 (explaining the origin of punishment as developing with 
“the dawn of known history”).  
 120. See id. at 221-22 (discussing death by stoning or whipping).  
 121. See id. Punishment took a less primitive form as heinous torture 
methods were no longer accepted. Id. at 224. 
 122. Developments of crime and punishment in Europe spread to America 
through the arrival of the pilgrims in 1620, and serious crimes were punished by 
death. Id. at 225. Not until the nineteenth century did penitentiaries develop as an 
alternative to capital executions. Id. at 226; see also Jalila Jefferson-Bullock, How 
Much Punishment Is Enough?: Embracing Uncertainty in Modern Sentencing 
Reform, 24 J.L. & POL’Y 345, 354 (2016) (stating that “colonial courts punished 
offenders according to three distinct purposes: retribution, deterrence, and 
incapacitation”).  
 123. See id. at 355-70 (explaining the fall of indeterminate 
sentencing/rehabilitation model and the move to reform for harsher sentencing). 
 124. See Greenawalt, supra note 117, at 1284.  
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criminal deserves to be punished or (2) the punishment serves as a 
social deterrent to crime.125  
Theories of punishment explain why the government should 
impose particular sanctions upon criminals.126 However, these 
theories are not without their deficiencies when it comes to practical 
application.127 While certain theories may provide an adequate 
foundation for punishing a particular criminal, they fail in universal 
application for all criminals.128 In the American legal system, the 
theories of retributivism and utilitarianism serve as the primary basis 
for the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.129 The Sentencing Guidelines 
included the possibility of rehabilitative practices, but such practices 
were given little credence or application in criminal sentencing.130 
However, modern scientific advancements are shaping the criminal 
                                                 
 125. See id.; see also JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
PRINCIPALS OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 15-16 (1823). Bentham, as the father of 
utilitarian theory, explains that the utility principle functions as behavioral test in 
which society either approves or disapproves of behavior depending upon the 
emotion elicited. Id. For example, Bentham states that the goal is to promote societal 
happiness and that actions interfering with that goal should be deterred. Id. at 16. 
 126. See Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the 
Rules: Finding and Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19, 32 (2003) (discussing the principal philosophies governing 
sentencing guidelines).  
 127. Compare Chad Flanders, Can Retributivism Be Saved?, 2014 BYU L. 
REV. 309, 354 (explaining that retributivism fails because it is too detached from 
practicality and “focuses solely on the moment of punishment and resists any 
discussion about criminal justice in general”), with Kyron Huigens, The Dead End of 
Deterrence, and Beyond, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943, 944-45 (2000) (explaining 
that deterrence suffers a predominant weakness by failing to recognize the 
conception of fault, which is the main component of blameworthiness at the crux of 
retributivism and a well-recognized requirement in the criminal justice system). 
 128. See Richard Lowell Nygaard, Crime, Pain, and Punishment: A Skeptic’s 
View, 102 DICK. L. REV. 355, 361 (1998) (expressing skepticism toward theories of 
punishment and questioning whether they fit appropriately with the offender and 
justify punishment).  
 129. See Jefferson-Bullock, supra note 122, at 351 (“The goals of federal 
punishment . . . rely on both utilitarian and retributivist principles that profess to 
punish offenders for both a larger societal benefit and to properly penalize moral 
blameworthiness.”).  
 130. See Kimberly L. Patch, The Sentencing Reform Act: Reconsidering 
Rehabilitation as a Critical Consideration in Sentencing, 39 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & 
CIV. CONFINEMENT 165, 171-72 (2013) (discussing how sentencing guidelines 
include a mention of rehabilitation but that the Sentencing Reform Act “doubted the 
efficacy of offender rehabilitation” and reflected that sentiment).  
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system and encouraging judges to use evidence-based strategies.131 
Moreover, the areas of neuroscience, psychotherapy, and behavioral 
science have strengthened the efficacy of rehabilitative practices, and 
scholars are breaking away from the stringent margins of retribution 
and deterrence and reconsidering rehabilitation as a possible 
alternative method in sentencing once more.132 
A. Dominant Forms of Punishments and Sentencing Guidelines 
In early America, the dominant forms of punishment theory 
opposed remedying the criminal’s ill-desired behavior; instead, they 
promoted punishment that sought to make an example of the 
wrongdoer by publicly castigating his or her behavior with hopes it 
would serve as a societal deterrent.133 Indeterminate sentencing—
sentencing with an indefinite length—peaked in the nineteenth 
century, during which the American penal system embraced the 
belief that people could be purged of their moral ailments.134 This 
rehabilitation model lasted well into the twentieth century, when 
criticisms of the model spilled over into sentencing in the 1960s.135 
                                                 
 131. See Rebecca Foxwell, Risk Assessments and Gender for Smarter 
Sentencing, 3 VA. J. CRIM. L. 435, 440-41 (2015) (discussing generally how new 
technologies are changing the penal system).  
 132. See Francis T. Cullen, Rehabilitation: Beyond Nothing Works, 42 CRIME 
& JUST. 299, 335-36 (2013) (discussing the restoration of rehabilitation and how the 
use of meta-analysis, “a quantitative synthesis of studies,” will help foster successful 
rehabilitation programs and create effective treatments that reduce recidivism rates); 
see also Chad Flanders, The Supreme Court and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 49 GA. L. 
REV. 383, 413 (2015) (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Graham v. 
Florida and the possibility of exploring rehabilitation as a more open method of 
criminal reform); Meghan J. Ryan, Science and the New Rehabilitation, 3 VA. J. 
CRIM. L. 261, 305-07 (2015). 
 133. See, e.g., Russel L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice 
of ‘Just’ Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843, 857-58 (2002). Christopher examines 
the nuances between consequential and retributivist thought, in which he concludes 
that for consequentialism “[t]o achieve general deterrence, the appearance or 
publicity of punishment is crucial. Actual punishment, without society’s awareness, 
generates no general deterrent effect[.]” Id.; see also Jefferson-Bullock, supra note 
122, at 354. 
 134. See Jefferson-Bullock, supra note 122, at 354-55 (describing how 
criminal punishment “adapted to mirror society’s overall perception of human 
beings as ‘rational and responsible for their own acts’”) (quoting ARTHUR W. 
CAMPBELL, THE LAW OF SENTENCING § 1:2 at 11 (1st ed. 1978)).  
 135. See Mark R. Fondacaro et al., The Rebirth of Rehabilitation in Juvenile 
and Criminal Justice: New Wine in New Bottles, 41 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 697, 699-704 
(2015) (stating the although rehabilitation was supported throughout the twentieth 
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Although earlier twenty-first century movements steered away from 
criminal rehabilitation,136 scholars now urge the justice system to 
reconsider its benefits for certain classes of criminals deemed most 
eligible for restorative practices.137  
1. Overview of Dominant Punishment Theories and Criticisms  
Theories of punishment may be best arranged within two 
categories of either backward- or forward-looking approaches.138 A 
backward-looking approach focuses on the moral blameworthiness 
of the criminal behavior and seeks to punish the crime already 
committed.139 The quintessential backward-looking approach is 
retributivism, which asserts a wrongdoer receives the punishment he 
or she deserves.140 Forward-looking approaches maintain that 
punishments serve to effectively abate criminal behavior within 
society.141 Such approaches include the consequentialist theories of 
utilitarianism and deterrence.142 Forward looking theories consider 
                                                                                                       
century, “achieving rehabilitation proved elusive”); see also Jefferson-Bullock, 
supra note 122, at 364-65. 
 136. See id. Fondacaro stated that Americans have moved away from the 
rehabilitative model because of a strong pessimistic view surrounding the “body of 
research on rehabilitation.” Id. at 704.  
 137. See id. at 725 (“The old mantra, ‘nothing works,’ has been laid to rest 
by systematic research on the causes and consequences of human behavior across 
social, psychological, and biological levels of analysis.”); see also Meghan J. Ryan, 
Finality and Rehabilitation, 4 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 121, 145-46 (2014) 
(discussing how modern biochemical innovations will help change offender 
behavior).  
 138. See Benjamin L. Apt, Do We Know How to Punish?, 19 NEW CRIM. L. 
REV. 437, 440 (2016).  
 139. See id. (assessing that the purpose for criminal punishment under a 
backward-looking theory is to focus “on the wrongfulness of the deed already 
done”).  
 140. See Christopher, supra note 133, at 845. The essence of retributivist 
thought is that the person being punished is receiving his or her just deserts. Id. 
Retributivism also focuses solely on the “past wrong or offense.” Id. According to 
John Rawls, “It is morally fitting that a person who does wrong should suffer in 
proportion to his wrongdoing.” John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 
3, 5 (1955); see also Apt, supra note 138, at 442. Apt discusses the set standard of 
punishment within retributivism, furthering that the severity of the punishment is 
correlated to the criminal’s blameworthiness. Id. 
 141. See Apt, supra note 138, at 448-49.  
 142. See id. at 448-55. The crucial distinction between forward-looking and 
backward-looking crimes is the treatment of punishment. Id. at 448. Apt states that 
the Bentham’s theory of utilitarianism hinged on the fact that “criminal punishment 
was defensible to the extent that it produced a positive social result by deflecting 
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how the punishment serves to benefit society, shifting the focus from 
the individual’s blameworthiness to the effectiveness of his or her 
punishment in deterring crime within society.143  
Scholars have been quick to criticize and invalidate the 
effectiveness of these theories in modern society.144 Indeed, theories 
of punishment are subject to weaknesses and gaps in their logic, 
rendering them ill-suited for only one theory to formally control over 
every facet of legal punishment.145 Professor David Garland urges 
that simply relying on these philosophical approaches for sentencing 
guidelines is not enough, as these theories often fall short of 
representing the nuances of modern punishment.146 Instead, Garland 
advocates for the justice system to consider a more sociological 
approach, which would allow for an understanding of punishment as 
a social institution, alive and breathing, rather than as a one-
dimensional, normative justification.147 Although scholars disagree 
on which theory reigns as the formal sovereign of legal 
punishment,148 they unanimously agree that punishment is not a one-
size-fits-all game.149 
                                                                                                       
people from future crimes.” Id. at 453. Consequentialism and deterrence also share 
the goal of preventing future crimes and “suppress[ing] certain undesirable 
incidents.” Id. at 448. In deterrence theory, “[t]he goal of punishment is rather to 
broadcast the message that this sort of crime will be punished in this way should 
anyone, whether the subject or anyone else, do it in the future.” Id. at 452.  
 143. See id. at 448-55.  
 144. See, e.g., Christopher, supra note 133, at 975 (concluding that if 
retributivists do not relinquish the notion of “just deserts,” the entire theory may 
collapse into consequentialism); see also Guyora Binder & Nicolas J. Smith, 
Framed: Utilitarianism and Punishment of the Innocent, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 115, 123-
25 (2000). The Binder and Smith article defends utilitarianism from proponents of 
retributivism and argues that, although subject to extensive criticism, utilitarianism 
works as an institutional rather than ethical philosophy. Id. 
 145. See generally Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 
67 (2005) (asserting that solving the problem of punishment theory involves not 
looking narrowly at one particular theory, but taking a hybrid approach 
incorporating multiple concepts).  
 146. See David Garland, Philosophical Argument and Ideological Effect: An 
Essay Review, 7 CONTEMP. CRISES 79, 82 (1983) (book review).  
 147. See id. at 80-83. Garland critiques an author for viewing the penal 
system under “terms of general moral philosophy.” Id. at 81. He states that “social 
institutions such as penal sanctions find it difficult to confine themselves to the 
realm of philosophical negativity.” Id. at 82. These systems require “definite 
techniques, practices, knowledges, objectives, and ideologies, all of which carry 
definite social and political implications.” Id. 
 148. Compare Christopher, supra note 133 (striking down the validity of 
retributivism as a cogent legal principle of punishment), with Dan Markel, Against 
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a. Theory of Retributivism 
Recently, retributivism has undergone criticism as an 
inadequate purveyor of justice.150 Professor Christopher asserts that 
retributivism currently reigns as the dominant theory of punishment, 
yet stands as one of the weaker theories.151 He claims one of 
retributivism’s failures is its circular logic, meaning that it “fails to 
satisfy its own criteria of just punishment.”152 However, proponents 
of the theory insist that its values are justified through its 
deontological principles, meaning there is justification within its 
inherent value.153 Yet, retributivism fails to answer the question of 
how society knows when an act is wrong, thus begging the question 
of what acts should be inherently wrong.154 Since retributivism 
merely determines that behavior should be punished solely on the 
premise that it is wrong, while failing to offer a definition of 
“wrongness,” it leads some scholars to conclude that the theory’s 
function is arbitrary and serves a minimal social purpose.155  
                                                                                                       
Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1433 (2004) (arguing for legal retributivism and 
removing mercy “from the realm of criminal justice”). 
 149. See Apt, supra note 138, at 464.  
 150. See Christopher, supra note 133, at 975.  
 151. See id. at 847, 849. Christopher states in his introduction that his 
“project” is not to advocate for consequentialism, but to prove that retributivism is 
not better than any other theory; he strives to dethrone the theory by exposing its 
many flaws. Id. at 849.  
 152. See id. Christopher states that a major failure of retributivism is its 
circular logic; he mentions in his introduction “the circularity stemming from the 
simple retributivist formula of ‘it’s right to punish criminals because doing so is 
right.’” Id. at 851 (quoting David Dolinko, Retributivism, Consequentialism, and the 
Intrinsic Goodness of Punishment, 16 LAW & PHIL. 507, 507 (1997)).  
 153. See Apt, supra note 138, at 441 (“Deontological principles are based on 
values of justice and fairness that are viewed as ends in themselves.”).  
 154. See id. at 443. Apt further relays the “pitfalls” within retributivist 
theories by stating that “positive law does not replace a reliance on society’s moral 
norms . . . society defers to the state to determine what is wrong and what is right.” 
Id.  
 155. See id. (“Retributivism is an encompassing philosophy of punishment. 
It explains: what must be punished—blameworthy acts; why crimes must be 
punished—because they are blameworthy; and to what degree they must be 
punished—in proportion to their blameworthiness.”); see also Flanders, supra note 
127, at 354 (stating that retributivism fails as a theory of punishment because it is 
“detached from any empirical truths about the world”).  
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b. Theory of Utilitarianism 
Although consequentialist theories of punishment are more 
“attentive to epistemological justifications,”156 one scholar concludes 
that even these theories have their flaws. Under deterrence theory, 
punishment discourages future crimes, but its effectiveness hinges on 
the communities’ understanding of sentencing procedures and 
crime.157 Critics of deterrence argue that many criminal offenders do 
not know the law; thus, they cannot be deterred from every crime.158 
Critics further argue that deterrence allows for punishment that is too 
far removed from the time of the violation, which decreases its effect 
and explanation as to why the system imposed the punishment—
leaving the criminal unaware of the gravity of the harm caused.159 
However, defenders of the theory claim that deterrence has 
invaluable components that are necessary for the purpose of 
punishment.160 Deterrence hinges on the innate human fear of 
punishment, and evidence suggests this conception withstands 
scrutiny.161 But, as one commentator notes, deterrence alone cannot 
“successfully function as a full-service theory that accounts for why 
we punish.”162 Even with the weaknesses of these theories of 
                                                 
 156. See Apt, supra note 138, at 448.  
 157. See id. at 450. Apt discusses that a major flaw in deterrence is its 
fixation on the punishment itself, in which the goal of punishment poses a nearly 
limitless degree of legal sentencing because the theory lacks a standard. See id. See 
generally Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. 
L. REV. 349 (1997) (discussing how incorporating social values would better shape 
the effect of deterrence in criminal law).  
 158. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Role of Deterrence in the 
Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 
949, 953-54 (2003). Robinson and Darley contend that criminal deterrence is only 
effective when three elements are met: (1) the criminal must know the law of the 
crime committed; (2) “[the criminal] must perceive the cost of violation as greater 
than the perceived benefit”; and (3) the criminal must weigh these costs during the 
commission of the crime. Id. at 953.  
 159. See id. at 954.  
 160. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Rehabilitating Bentham’s Theory of 
Excuses, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 383, 388 (2015). Professor Dripps explains how 
Bentham viewed deterrence as “both punishment’s primary benefit and purpose.” Id. 
 161. See Nygaard, supra note 128, at 361. Nygaard contends that “[a]t heart, 
deterrence is coercion by fear[.] . . . People do not act out of respect for, or duty to, 
the law[;] . . . [i]nstead they fear suffering if they do not act in accordance with the 
law.” Id. 
 162. Id. at 361-62; see also Robinson & Darley, supra note 158, at 954.  
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punishment, both deterrence and retributivism remain the crux of 
modern sentencing guidelines.163 
2. Epistemic Punishment and Current Sentencing Guidelines 
The current sentencing guidelines, which primarily serve to 
advance retributivist and utilitarian theories of punishment, are 
deficient because they lack a reflection of the individual criminal and 
the requisite knowledge of social values.164 Apportioning the proper 
sentence to a crime requires an understanding of why the justice 
system imposes punishment.165 In part, this involves identifying the 
type of behavior society condemns.166 In determining what 
constitutes reprehensible conduct, the criminal system often yields to 
the norms of social morality, as this may provide the purest source 
for why society inflicts punishment.167 Alternatively, courts cannot 
rely on moral values alone to supply sufficient guidelines for 
punishment—there must be some other governing authority.168 Thus, 
scholars contend that the judicial system must take into account a 
multiplicity of factors when apportioning sentencing.169 To achieve 
                                                 
 163. See Frase, supra note 145, at 69, 73 (“[P]unishment purposes and 
limitations are traditionally grouped in two categories: utilitarian and 
nonutilitarian.”). Frase further states that retributivism is the major nonutilitarian 
sentencing principle. Id. at 73.  
 164. See Apt, supra note 138, at 463. Apt discusses that sentencing 
guidelines fail to “tie[] punishment to knowledge.” Id. These guidelines are 
“oriented around incarceration” and should include “advisory tools for analyzing a 
criminal’s individual rehabilitative needs.” Id. Apt states that “penal methods that 
apply evidence-based methods that are also not strictly deleterious to the subjects, 
are closer to an epistemic foundation and conflict less with other social values.” Id. 
at 465.  
 165. See Frase, supra note 145, at 67-68.  
 166. See Apt, supra note 138, at 468-69. In Do We Know How to Punish, 
Professor Apt discusses the importance of how society knows to punish certain 
behavior. See id. In part, he states that sometimes society simply collectively agrees 
on some morally condemnable behavior that should be punished; other times, he 
remarks that it’s simply because “the law tells us so.” Id. He argues that society 
blindly accepts laws without questioning how it justifies punitive practices. Id.; see 
also Kahan, supra note 157, at 354 (“Empirical studies of why people obey the law 
suggest that these effects generalize. Such studies reveal a strong correlation 
between a person’s obedience and her perception of others’ behavior and attitudes 
toward the law.”).  
 167. See Apt, supra note 138, at 468.  
 168. See id. (discussing that “[m]oral tenets do not suffice as a corpus of 
regulatory guidelines for criminal punishment”).  
 169. See Frase, supra note 145, at 75 (“[D]isproportionate penalties undercut 
the law’s desired norm-reinforcing messages and reduce public respect for the 
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that goal, one scholar concludes that sentencing guidelines could 
benefit from reflecting developments in areas such as social science 
and psychology.170  
States and federal jurisdictions each abide by their own 
sentencing guidelines, but each system operates under similar 
objectives.171 For instance, when federal and state judges consult 
sentencing guidelines, they are primarily focused on four purposes of 
sentencing: punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation.172 These purposes provide a relatively narrow means in 
achieving the desired sentencing goals because judges tend to weigh 
them disparately.173 This results in courts distributing sentences based 
heavily on serving the purposes of punishment and deterrence and 
undermining practices of rehabilitation.174  
a. Modern Sentencing Guidelines  
The current motivations behind the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines have been criticized as flawed and misguided approaches 
to punishing criminal behavior.175 During the 1960s, the earlier 
                                                                                                       
criminal law and criminal justice systems.”); see also Apt, supra note 138, at 463 
(“If judges are to retain the power to sentence criminals, then they must at the very 
least compose sentences in consultation with experts from other fields, from 
psychology to sociology.”).  
 170. See Apt, supra note 138, at 463.  
 171. See Mirko Bagaric, Nick Fischer & Gabrielle Wolf, Bringing 
Sentencing into the 21st Century: Closing the Gap Between Practice and Knowledge 
by Introducing Expertise into Sentencing Law, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 785, 792 (2017). 
 172. See Fiona Doherty, Indeterminate Sentencing Returns: The Invention of 
Supervised Release, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 958, 997 (2013). 
 173. See id. (“Although judges always had to consult these four purposes, 
not all purposes applied equally to every sentence.”). 
 174. See Jefferson-Bullock, supra note 122, at 351, 402. The Sentences 
Guidelines do not treat rehabilitation as a primary purpose for incarceration. Id. at 
402. The Sentencing Reform Act relinquished rehabilitative practices altogether and 
“promot[ed] retribution and deterrence to punishment purpose prominence.” Id. at 
389. See generally Jacob Schuman, Sentencing Rules and Standards: How We 
Decide Criminal Punishment, 83 TENN. L. REV. 1 (2015) (discussing that the overall 
process of using the guidelines table has created narrow results of possible prison 
terms).  
 175. See Jefferson-Bullock, supra note 122, at 350 (“In an effort to appear 
tough on crime, lawmakers chose long sentencing periods almost arbitrarily, with no 
empirical foundation or justification for sentence length.”). Jefferson-Bullock further 
discusses other misguided steps of sentencing reform, including how “lawmakers 
indiscriminately created an overly punitive sentencing scheme with disastrous 
outcomes.” Id. 
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indeterminate sentencing model, which relied on rehabilitative 
practices and parole, suffered serious criticism as an efficient 
practice.176 The determinate model, focusing on uniformity and 
longer sentences, replaced indeterminate sentencing with stricter 
guidelines to remedy the previous era of unbridled judicial discretion 
in apportioning sentencing.177 The new Sentencing Guidelines under 
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 purported to create uniformity 
amongst courts when distributing sentences to criminals committing 
crimes of the same or similar nature.178 The uniformity in sentencing 
would end disparity amongst criminals caused by factors such as 
socioeconomic status or race.179  
However, the Federal Guidelines made it difficult for judges to 
part from the strict formalities because a judge could stray from the 
sentencing structure only under exceptional circumstances.180 
Although the Supreme Court in the United States v. Booker decision 
lessened the severity of the Guidelines by deeming them advisory 
and nonbinding, the system remains criticized for lacking hard data 
                                                 
 176. See id. at 364-65 (discussing that, by the 1970s and 1980s, the public 
began to doubt “whether true rehabilitation of offenders was occurring or even 
achievable”).  
 177. See id. at 366-67. Sentencing determinations sought to reform the 
previous unbridled discretion of the judiciary under the indeterminate sentencing 
era. See id. at 367. Consequentially, this reform lead to arbitrarily created harsher 
punishments. See id. at 366. 
 178. See Schuman, supra note 174, at 11; see also Jefferson-Bullock, supra 
note 122, at 352. Jefferson-Bullock states that “[t]he Sentencing Guidelines 
purported to establish honesty, uniformity, and proportionality in sentencing.” Id. at 
375; see also Rebecca Krauss, Comment, Neuroscience and Institutional Choice in 
Federal Sentencing Law, 120 YALE L.J. 367, 375 (2010) (“[T]he Guidelines ensure 
‘equal nonsense for all’: they provide a means of confining intuitive and nonrational 
sentencing decisions to one decision-making body and then applying those decisions 
equally to all criminal defendants.”).  
 179. See Schuman, supra note 174, at 12 (“Binding guidelines, it was 
thought, could end such disparities by ensuring that like cases were treated 
equally.”); see also Ann Marie Tracey & Paul Fiorelli, Throwing the Book[er] at 
Congress: The Constitutionality and Prognosis of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines and Congressional Control in Light of United States v. Booker, 2005 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 1199, 1202 (stating that sentencing guidelines “vastly [restricted] 
discretion” and sought uniformity).  
 180. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (Supp. 2004) (“[T]he court shall impose a 
sentence . . . unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating 
circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the 
Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines.”); see also U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0(a)(1) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014); Bagaric, 
Fischer & Wolf, supra note 171, at 785 (stating that sentencing law among states is 
“fundamentally broken”).  
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to support sentencing lengths.181 The scheme lacks fair consideration 
of evidence-based sentencing, which would allow for more 
rehabilitation programs.182 Scholars advocate for reforming 
sentencing guidelines to encompass more than merely purposes of 
punishment such that they begin to take into consideration concrete 
sciences and social institutions.183  
b. Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Social Institution of 
Punishment 
Current sentencing guidelines rely only on the general guidance 
of various punishment theories when considering the “suitability” of 
the crime to the criminal.184 Although it seems the nucleus of 
punishment theory is proportionality—asserting the punishment must 
                                                 
 181. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 266 (2005) (holding that the 
mandatory aspect of subsection (b)(1) of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines cannot 
be mandatorily required in a manner consistent with congressional intent); see also 
Jefferson-Bullock, supra note 122, at 376 (stating that the Sentencing Guidelines 
ranges are more biased than empirically based). The Supreme Court decided that the 
Guidelines, as they were written, imposed mandatory requirements binding on 
district judges. Booker, 543 F.3d at 233. The Court stated that the Guidelines should 
be one factor considered in the analysis of sentencing. See id. at 234; see also 
Schuman, supra note 174, at 18 (“Although Booker gives district judges significant 
discretion to depart from the Sentencing Guidelines, a number of pressures work 
together to encourage them to adhere to the Commission’s recommendations.”). 
 182. See Frase, supra note 145, at 69 (stating the “overall structure and 
specific provisions of the existing Guidelines lack any clear underlying or principled 
basis”); see also Jefferson-Bullock, supra note 122, at 379 (“One of the seven 
Commissioners, in a dissent, charg[ed] that the guidelines were preceded by little or 
no empirical study.”). The Guidelines are also criticized for their “status quo bias,” 
meaning that the Guidelines are anchored in a psychological bias of the current 
practices of punishment at the time. Id. at 379-80. Any attempts to improve the 
current sentencing models also “neglect to employ hard, evidence-based research to 
support sentencing choices.” Id. at 383.  
 183. See Frase, supra note 145, at 69 (“[F]ederal sentencing is no more 
coherent and principled today than it was before the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
were adopted.”); see also Bagaric, Fischer & Wolf, supra note 171, at 813; Garland, 
supra note 146, at 82. The moral philosophies of retributivism and utilitarianism 
“divert attention from the social or political significance of the institutions of 
penalty.” Garland, supra note 146, at 85. 
 184. See Apt, supra note 138, at 463, 469. Apt presents “suitability” as a 
means to “ti[e] punishment to knowledge.” Id. at 463. Suitability requires (1) that 
the criminal justice system “attend more consistently to society’s common moral 
values” and (2) that the criminal justice system incorporate “current empirical 
knowledge” that demonstrates reparative effectiveness through developments in 
psychology and sociology. Id.  
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fit the crime—scholars contend that the punishment should first fit 
the criminal.185 Criminal justice reforms advocate for evidence-based 
sentencing guidelines that will consider various factors regarding the 
individual criminal, not just the crime.186 Such relevant factors 
include the criminal’s mental state, low recidivism rate, and threat to 
public welfare, which suggests that appropriate sentencing requires 
more than uniformly punishing a committed wrong.187 Evidence-
based practices have escalated in popularity as more states have 
implemented a variety of evidence-based sentencing procedures.188  
Evidence-based sentencing implicates multiple facets of 
society, which legal scholars contend the current guidelines 
desperately require.189 Professor Garland asserts that current 
philosophical theories influencing sentencing guidelines exist within 
a single dimension—therefore failing to account for the complexities 
and nuances of modern punishment.190 He proposes viewing 
punishment as intertwined within the web of social structures; 
instead of making punishments arbitrarily fit into abstract theories, 
punishments should be more interpretive of present societal 
                                                 
 185. See generally Frase, supra note 145 (discussing how sentencing 
principles fail to recognize the difference between high-risk offenders and low-risk 
offenders who commit the same crime and how giving each the same punishment 
conflicts with the purpose of sentencing).  
 186. See generally id. (stating that the current sentencing guidelines focus on 
promoting uniformity and proportionality and do not consider individual offenders); 
see also Melissa Hamilton, Risk-Needs Assessment: Constitutional and Ethical 
Challenges, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231, 237 (2015); Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based 
Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 
803, 805 (2014) (discussing how evidence-based sentencing encourages judges to 
consider various factors about the criminal, such as “socioeconomic status, gender, 
age, family, and neighborhood characteristics,” to help predict recidivism rates). 
 187. See Frase, supra note 145, at 68 (“[I]f two first-time offenders commit 
the same crime but one has genuine feelings of remorse, strong family ties, and other 
indications of amenability to supervision and low risk of reoffending, putting that 
offender on probation and sending his much riskier counterpart to prison saves scare 
correctional resources while still promoting public safety.”). 
 188. See Starr, supra note 186, at 804-05 (discussing that a “growing number 
of U.S. jurisdictions are adopting policies that deliberately encourage judges” to 
consider various factors about the criminal).  
 189. See Apt, supra note 138, at 463; see also Bargaric, Fischer & Wolf, 
supra note 171, at 786; Jefferson-Bullock, supra note 122, at 395-97 (discussing the 
deficiencies in the current guidelines). 
 190. DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY 9 (1990) (stating 
that “philosophies of punishment, at least in their traditional form, are based upon a 
rather idealized and one-dimensional image of punishment”).  
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infrastructures.191 Punishment is viewed as a product of sociological 
forces merged together from “forms of knowledge, legal, moral, and 
cultural categories”—extending it far beyond just legal theory and 
penology.192 Therefore, sentencing procedures must provide for a 
multitude of perspectives in different areas of research and studies in 
order to ensure fairness.193  
Under a sociological approach, the source of authority for 
modern penal practices becomes associated with more than 
behaviors society deems fit for punishment—which also heavily 
influence theoretical sentencing.194 As Garland further claims, 
cultural phenomena—the manner in which we “render [the world] 
orderly and meaningful”—significantly contributes to the 
methodology of punishment.195 People often determine punishable 
behaviors based on their distinct value systems—tending to only 
condone harsh punishment when it coincides with what people deem 
truly “deserving” of the perpetrator.196 Suitability and social 
                                                 
 191. See id. at 10. Garland further notes that: 
What is needed now, in the sociology of punishment, is an 
analytical account of the cultural forces which influence 
punishment, and, in particular, an account of the patterns 
imposed upon punishment by the character of contemporary 
sensibilities. Such an account must acknowledge the reality and 
determinative capacity of feelings, sensibilities, behavioral 
proprieties, and cultural values, in order to trace their influence 
upon the organization of punishment.  
Id. at 197. 
 192. Id. at 21. Garland states that punishment is grounded in much more than 
mere legal theory; it survives on “social roots and . . . wider forms of life and their 
history [through which] we can begin to understand the informal logic that 
underpins penal practice.” Id.  
 193. See id. at 11-12 (“[T]he sociology of punishment is presently 
constituted by a diverse variety of ‘perspectives’, each of which tends to develop its 
researches in virtual disregard of other ways of proceeding. In effect, the sociology 
of punishment is reinvented with each subsequent study.”). 
 194. See id. at 195.  
 195. Id. (“[S]ensibilities and mentalities have major implications for the 
ways in which we punish offenders. These cultural patterns structure the ways in 
which we think about criminals.”).  
 196. See SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PUNISHMENT OF CRIME 26-27 (Margit E. 
Oswald, Steffen Bieneck & Jörg Hupfeld-Heinemann eds., 2009) [hereinafter 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY]; see also Apt, supra note 138, at 468 (“A society may have a 
strong consensus about what acts should be designated as crimes. Its members may 
generally agree about what acts are morally and legally permissible to prevent or 
combat imminent crimes. . . . The conflict of values and the consequent 
recommended actions becomes more ambiguous and difficult to resolve where the 
response is not so much rectification as reprobation.”). SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF 
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institutions of punishment reject using sentencing guidelines mainly 
to further retributivist and utilitarian agendas and assert rehabilitation 
as more than just a consideration, but as a primary form of 
sentencing.197 The Supreme Court bolstered this assertion in the 
recent case of Graham v. Florida, in which the Court pronounced 
rehabilitation as a necessary penological goal.198 Therefore, emerging 
scientific research from psychiatry, social psychology, genetics, 
pharmacology, and behavioral neuroscience can be used to create an 
innovative model of evidence-based guidance in sentencing, which 
would encompass more than the mere theoretical purposes of 
punishment.199  
B. The Revival of the Rehabilitation Model: New Practices, 
Criticisms, and Abuse Victims 
For decades, scholars assumed that the theory of rehabilitation 
had been cast into the shadows of the more-prevailing theories of 
retributivism and utilitarianism.200 Recently, however, rehabilitation 
has received a breath of revival as a fair and viable sentencing 
                                                                                                       
PUNISHMENT OF CRIME discusses that society’s compliance and acceptance of the 
law is largely based on how the law relates to larger moral value systems. SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 196, at 28. If the law corresponds to people’s values, that 
in itself entices people to amend their behavior to the law. Id.  
 197. See Apt, supra note 138, at 463 (“[T]he principle of suitability inclines 
toward rehabilitation and related reparative theories.”). 
 198. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 48, 50 (2010) (holding that the 
Eighth Amendment prohibits sentencing a juvenile to life without parole for a 
nonhomicidal crime—“[a] State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to 
such an offender, but must impose a sentence that provides some meaningful 
opportunity for release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation”).  
 199. See Nancy Gertner, Neuroscience and Sentencing, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 
533, 541 (2016); see also Cecelia Klingele, The Promises and Perils of Evidence-
Based Corrections, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 537, 551 (2015) (discussing how 
evidence-based correctional systems are on the rise and are considered a favorable 
method in the justice system). The current Guidelines have no rational basis; 
therefore, the system calls for sentencing by “more than [an] application of a 
formula.” Gertner, supra note 199, at 541. It requires “evidence-based guidance 
from neuroscience, social psychology, and psychiatry.” Id. Klingele defines 
evidence-based correction techniques as “practices includ[ing] the use of actuarial 
risk and need assessment instruments, motivational interviewing and counseling 
techniques, deterrence-based sanction programs, and incentives to probationers and 
parolees for successful compliance with court orders.” Klingele, supra note 199, at 
538-39.  
 200. See Nygaard, supra note 128, at 362 (“Today, rehabilitation is dead.”).  
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procedure within the criminal justice system.201 Although 
rehabilitation was a popular theory in the early twentieth century by 
which the Progressive Era shaped its modern form,202 rehabilitative 
practices had lost their glamour by the 1960s and increasingly 
through the 1980s, when public officials implemented the “crack 
down on crime” frenzy—catalyzing the storming resurgence of 
retributivist theory.203 But through developing areas of science,204 
rehabilitation is once more stationed at the frontline of criminal 
justice reform—discrediting the old “nothing works” mantra.205 In 
undergoing its own reform, rehabilitation has shifted its focus away 
from treating criminals as those “mentally diseased” in need of a 
cure to considering the social, psychological, and behavioral 
channels that lead to criminal behavior and eliminating those factors 
to restore the criminal back to society.206 These reformed strategies 
                                                 
 201. See Fondacaro et al., supra note 135, at 698. This renaissance of 
rehabilitation is based on the emerging “evidence-based intervention strategies that 
draw on social ecological theories of human behavior to not only understand the 
social, psychological, and biological drivers of crime, but to identify intervention 
strategies that are effective in preventing crime and reducing recidivism.” Id.  
 202. See id. at 701. The Progressive Era gave birth to modern rehabilitation 
as it is understood today through the development of psychology. Id. This period 
focused on “indeterminate sentencing, parole, and probation.” Id.; see also Ryan, 
supra note 132, at 274 (“It was during this period that the public’s faith in scientific 
and psychiatric advances such as psychoanalysis grew.”).  
 203. See Fondacaro et al., supra note 135, at 703. The 1980s in particular 
signaled the move away from rehabilitation because drug and violent crimes were on 
the rise. Id. 
 204. See Ryan, supra note 132, at 265 (“Recent scientific advances in the 
fields of pharmacology, genetics, and neuroscience—and the media’s 
communication of these advances to the public at large—have paved the way for 
public acceptance of rehabilitative ideals.”).  
 205. See Fondacaro et al., supra note 135, at 698, 703 (“Robert Martinson’s 
evaluation of numerous rehabilitation programs was perceived to have demonstrated 
that ‘nothing works’ to reduce recidivism.”); see also Robert Martinson, What 
Works?—Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, PUB. INT. 22, 27-28 (1974) 
(stating that rehabilitation had not shown any progress in reducing recidivism rates 
amongst offenders); Jerome G. Miller, The Debate on Rehabilitating Criminals: Is It 
True that Nothing Works? WASH. POST (Mar. 16, 1989), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1989/04/23/criminology/3e8fb43
0-9195-4f07-b7e2-c97a970c96fe/?utm_term=.256c5db25fb4 
[https://perma.cc/N4DE-PPQP]. The “nothing works” mantra was coined in 
response to the skepticism of rehabilitation and its ability to reform offenders. Id. 
 206. See Fondacaro et al., supra note 135, at 726; see also Apt, supra note 
138, at 458-59; Gertner, supra note 199, at 544-45 (“The ‘new rehabilitation’—now 
informed by neuroscience and evidence-based science—offers the possibility of yet 
another shift in American sentencing away from retribution toward an approach 
more finely tailored to the individual, his needs, and his future.”); Nygaard, supra 
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have shifted rehabilitation’s focus away from treating the “entire 
offender” to changing the offender’s behaviors.207  
1. Resurgence of Rehabilitative Practices: The New 
Rehabilitation Model 
In its most basic form, rehabilitation sought to “resocialize” 
criminal offenders by providing treatment for their internal 
demons—typically manifested as deeply rooted psychological 
ailments leading to the commission of crime.208 For the old 
rehabilitation model, successful treatment meant returning the 
offender back to society with a low recidivism rate and a greater 
appreciation for societal values.209 Older rehabilitation models often 
achieved these ends through methods of religious education or 
counseling.210 However, notions of curing criminals of their “mental 
illnesses” through methods of questionable success rates subjected 
rehabilitation theory to scathing skepticism of its effectiveness.211 As 
crime rates rose in the 1980s, more scholars doubted the efficacy of 
the rehabilitation model.212 Newer models are less susceptible to this 
                                                                                                       
note 128, at 362. New psychological and behavioral evidence is transforming the 
rehabilitative process to offer a clearer understanding of the criminal and further aids 
effective intervention programs. Fondacaro et al., supra note 135, at 699. Nygaard 
discusses rehabilitation as a means to “change” the criminal’s behavior. Nygaard, 
supra note 128, at 362. He states part of demise of rehabilitation was this “flawed 
premise” that such practices could change the criminal into a productive member of 
society, but he recognizes change must come from the criminal’s internal desire to 
want rehabilitation. Id. 
 207. See Ryan, supra note 132, at 266.  
 208. See Apt, supra note 138, at 458-59. Apt reminds his readers that 
although rehabilitation concentrates on psychological ailments, it also recognizes the 
psychology of the criminal is not the sole problem. See id. He states, “Ideally, 
rehabilitation should include efforts to ameliorate the social circumstances, such as 
deleterious family relations or child abuse, poverty and unemployment, inadequate 
education, or a local culture that encourages certain crimes.” Id. at 459. 
 209. See Michael Vitiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 TUL. L. REV. 
1011, 1012 (1991) (stating that critics challenged rehabilitation’s assumption that 
“criminals were sick and in need of treatment”).  
 210. See Ryan, supra note 132, at 266.  
 211. See Apt, supra note 138, at 461 n.72. Common criticisms of 
rehabilitation found that the theory disregards the “wrongfulness of the crime” by 
placing attention on the criminal’s needs and psychiatric care. Id. However, Apt 
states this criticism is misplaced as rehabilitation is still considered punishment 
through restraining the liberty of the criminal. See id. Fairness is assessed by 
considering “what is appropriate and effective for the individual subject.” Id. 
 212. See Martinson, supra note 205, at 25 (asserting that rehabilitation does 
not work well as a system); Ryan, supra note 132, at 280.  
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criticism since rapid developments in technology have redirected 
rehabilitative approaches by reaching out to more criminals who 
would likely benefit from the programs.213 
a. Rehabilitation and the Brave New World of Modern 
Science  
Since rehabilitation has successfully parted from using methods 
of moral transformation to reform offender behavior, it has redeemed 
its credibility.214 As of now, science serves as the leading mechanism 
propelling rehabilitation back into the criminal justice system and 
away from the pseudo-science realm.215 Current rehabilitative 
programs rely on progressive bodies of research, conducted by 
behavioral experts and developmental psychologists, to explain how 
cranial features such as neuroplasticity—the brain’s ability to change 
throughout an entire lifespan—alters the approach of modern 
rehabilitative practices.216 Understanding the neurological nuances of 
the brain’s function will not only lead to better treatment for 
criminals, but also “lead to better prediction of recidivism, a rational 
basis of sentencing, and customized rehabilitation.”217  
Neuroscience evidence suggests that new treatments may soon 
be available to alleviate criminal behavior.218 In determining 
appropriate treatments, neuroscience technology may use functional 
                                                 
 213. See Fondacaro et al., supra note 135, at 697-98.  
 214. See Gertner supra note 199, at 544 (stating that the difficulty is 
avoiding “the perils of the ‘old rehabilitation’ and its overreliance on faith”).  
 215. See Ryan, supra note 132, at 305 (“But this return to rehabilitation has 
an even more important fount: it derives from recent scientific advances.”).  
 216. See Fondacaro et al., supra note 135, at 721-22 (“Lifespan development 
theory is supported by research showing that identity relevant conflicts can spur 
psychosocial growth as individuals enter different life stages; environment changes 
can lead to adaptive responses throughout adulthood; and training can induce 
changes in the adult brain.”); see also Ryan, supra note 132, at 264-66.  
 217. See David M. Eagleman, Neuroscience and the Law, 45 HOUS. LAW. 36, 
37 (2008). 
 218. See Henry T. Greely, Neuroscience and Criminal Justice: Not 
Responsibility but Treatment, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 1103, 1105-06 (2008) (asserting 
that an increased understanding of how the brain functions may be used to find “new 
ways to intervene in human behavior—to change minds by directly changing 
brains”); see also Regina Nuzzo, Brain Scans Predict Which Criminals Are More 
Likely to Reoffend: Neuroimaging “Biomarker” Linked to Rearrest After 
Incarceration, NATURE (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.nature.com/news/brain-scans-
predict-which-criminals-are-more- likely-to-reoffend-1.12672 [https://perma.cc/ 
72MA-44JF].  
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magnetic resonance imagining (fMRI) screenings to decipher 
intricacies in brain function that would help discern the habits and 
patterns of criminal offenders.219 The possibility of using brain scans 
to determine criminal culpability may be closer to reality than 
science fiction.220 As one study by Joshua Buckholtz suggests, brain 
scans can reveal the neural activity involved in both the moral and 
legal decision-making processes.221 Moreover, neuroscience 
technology allows researchers to develop successful therapeutic 
programs that will help offenders change their behavior by engaging 
in therapies that would improve social and relationship skills, 
particularly through practices such as mindfulness or cognitive 
remediation.222 However, neuroscience is not the only option; other 
alternative methods such as “neurosurgery, deep brain stimulation, 
drugs, and vaccines” are just a few approaches that science can use 
to prompt medical intervention of criminal behavior.223  
The pharmaceutical industry’s advancements in drug 
production and mass marketing schemes have made this method of 
treatment one of the most accessible for the new rehabilitation 
model.224 The continuous release of new drugs has contributed to 
staggering developments in treating substance addictions such as 
alcoholism or heroin abuse.225 The pharmaceutical industry’s 
                                                 
 219. See Nuzzo, supra note 218 (discussing how brain scans may indicate 
the likelihood of whether offenders will commit crimes again by assessing whether 
there is low or high activity in the region of the brain associated with decision 
making).  
 220. See Joshua Buckholtz et al., The Neural Correlates of Third-Party 
Punishment, 60 NEURON 930, 930-32 (2008) (discussing a neurological study 
assessing the brain’s reaction when making culpability decisions).  
 221. See id. at 935 (discussing the results of the study pertinent to the brain 
regions affecting legal and moral reasoning).  
 222. See Fondacaro et al., supra note 135, at 724 (stating that the 
neuroscience-based method is “more effective than control oriented programs that 
emphasize discipline, surveillance, and intense supervision”); see also Arielle R. 
Baskin-Sommers & Karelle Fonteneau, Correctional Change Through 
Neuroscience, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 423, 433 (2016) (discussing mindfulness as a 
verifiable treatment possibility influenced by neuroscience).  
 223. See Greely, supra note 218, at 1106. Greely states the progress of such 
methods may be speculative at best but are “guesses with some basis in science.” Id. 
Current uses of pharmaceutical treatment haven proven to reduce aspects of criminal 
behavior through drugs for alcoholics and chemical castration for sex offenders. See 
id.  
 224. See Ryan, supra note 132, at 307.  
 225. See id. at 308 (discussing various drugs such as methadone and 
buprenorphine used to treat substance abuse); see also Greely, supra note 218, at 
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approach to mass marketing drugs through commercial 
advertisements has normalized this type of treatment method.226 
Although not fully realized in practice, new drugs could also be used 
to help control criminal behavior; for example, antidepressants may 
be used to combat violent tendencies.227 But regardless of the various 
benefits offered by new drugs and other rehabilitative 
technologies,228 this method remains vulnerable to abuse.229 
b. Criticisms of the New Rehabilitation Model  
To modify a popular saying, with new treatment comes great 
responsibility.230 As science develops and rehabilitation implements 
various new methods of treatment, critics are wary of taking 
rehabilitation too far.231 For instance, there is no regulatory 
framework that covers all the possibilities of rehabilitative treatment 
and procedures, specifically for invasive brain treatments.232 Testing 
invasive treatments, such a psychosurgery, is not only difficult to 
regulate, but also difficult to accomplish according to ethical and 
                                                                                                       
1106 (stating that pharmaceutical treatments have been most successful with sex 
offenders and drug addicts).  
 226. See Ryan, supra note 132, at 311 (“The combination of this increased 
direct-to-consumer marketing of pharmaceuticals . . . has created a culture in which 
average consumers may believe that nearly all of their ills are treatable by 
pharmaceuticals.”).  
 227. See Greely, supra note 218, at 1110.  
 228. See Fondacaro et al., supra note 135, at 723 (discussing various other 
recently researched rehabilitation treatments, including: “Aggression Replacement 
Therapy (ART), Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT), [and] Milieu therapy”); see 
also Eagleman, supra note 217, at 37-39 (discussing the role of neuroscience and 
technology in developing new treatment); see generally Greely, supra note 218 
(discussing throughout the article various methods of neuroscience treatments and 
their criticisms).  
 229. See Greely, supra note 218, at 1110 (cautioning that using drugs as 
treatment may lead to problems with “mandatory drug program[s] on non-
institutionalized persons,” which could further lead to forced injections or other 
invasive techniques).  
 230. This quotation was originally stated by Ben Parker in the movie Spider 
Man; he stated, “With great power comes great responsibility.” SPIDER MAN 
(Columbia Pictures 2002).  
 231. See Greely, supra note 218, at 1121 (asserting that it is not entirely clear 
which neuroscience methods are “safe and effective for controlling criminal 
behavior”).  
 232. See id. (asserting that although neuroscience treatment methods may be 
effective, there will likely be issues with ethical testing, even more so when dealing 
with human brains).  
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socially practical standards.233 Further, new drug treatments can be 
effective, but approval for new drugs by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) can take upward of ten years and millions of 
dollars in cost, thereby hindering rehabilitative processes.234 One 
scholar also argues that “neorehabilitation” methods are so costly 
because they only acquire the best results by keeping offenders in the 
program longer.235 
The new rehabilitation model also raises several problems at 
the sentencing level.236 For instance, proper assessment of eligibility 
for rehabilitation sentencing poses familiar difficulties, particularly 
in the area of criminal risk assessment.237 One critic expresses her 
concern that rehabilitative sentencing under the newer model not 
only rehabilitates the wrong offenders, but causes distortion of 
justice and creates constitutional conflicts.238 To bolster her opinion, 
some studies suggest that rehabilitation methods would 
comprehensively benefit high-risk offenders,239 but the current 
system focuses solely on low-risk offenders. Moreover, this 
preference of low-risk offenders would risk increasing harsh 
                                                 
 233. See id. Greely discusses the difficulty in proving certain methods of 
“neuroscience interventions” as safe and effective modes of treatment. Id. In new 
drug cases there are various limitations on testing; for instance, it is particularly 
difficult finding volunteers for clinical trials. See id. 
 234. See id. (discussing various problems with regulating new rehabilitative 
treatments).  
 235. See Jessica M. Eaglin, Against Neorehabilitation, 66 SMU L. REV. 189, 
212 (2013).  
 236. See Gertner, supra note 199, at 545 (stating that assessing criminals’ 
eligibility for rehabilitative sentencing is still very complicated under the new 
rehabilitation model).  
 237. See id. (“[R]isk-assessment instruments, which enable a more informed 
choice about which offenders will recidivate than the judges ‘back of the envelope’ 
intuition, may well be skewed by inappropriate generalizations based on race or 
gender.”).  
 238. See Eaglin, supra note 235, at 211, 218 (discussing how, statistically, 
high-risk offenders would benefit the most from rehabilitative treatment, though the 
system focuses on low-risk offenders, and commenting on how such treatment will 
“potentially increase[] punishment for those offenders viewed as undeserving of 
rehabilitation because they are not low-level offenders”).  
 239. See Craig Dowden & D.A. Andrews, Effective Correctional Treatment 
and Violent Reoffending: A Meta-Analysis, 42 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY 449, 460 
(2000); see also Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Edward J. Latessa & Alexander M. 
Holsinger, The Risk Principle in Action: What Have We Learned from 13,676 
Offenders and 97 Correctional Programs?, 52 CRIME & DELINQ. 77, 88 (2006). 
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sentencing for those offenders deemed incapable of rehabilitation.240 
However, regardless of the new rehabilitative model’s limitations 
and concerns, its ability to help offenders of low recidivism, minimal 
risk, or diminished culpability is indispensable.241  
2. Abuse Victims, Neuroscience, and Diminished Culpability  
Determining how the brain responds to prolonged abuse is 
essential in assessing criminal culpability.242 Empirical studies 
illustrate a statistical correlation between victimization and violent 
offending.243 The violent tendencies are often a result of the severe 
psychological abuse upon the abuse victim.244 Physical battering can 
leave noticeable injuries such as concussions, but it can also leave 
traces of abuse that cannot be seen or detected.245 These injuries are 
called physiological injuries.246 As a result of these injuries, the abuse 
victim often chooses to subject herself to the abuse regardless of the 
availability of professional intervention.247 The theory of BWS 
                                                 
 240. See Eaglin, supra note 235, at 219; see also Clemency for Battered 
Women, CRIM. JUST. RES., http://criminal-justice.iresearchnet.com/crime/domestic-
violence/clemency-for-battered-women/ [https://perma.cc/NBW5-3P9P] (last visited 
May 7, 2018) (stating that statistically abuse victims have a recidivism rate of 23%).  
 241. See supra Subsection II.B.1.a (discussing the benefits of the new 
rehabilitation model).  
 242. See Jozsef Meszaros, Achieving Peace of Mind: The Benefits of 
Neurobiological Evidence for Battered Women Defendants, 23 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 117, 146-47 (“[T]here are physiological effects of battering, which may 
result from any of the conditions imposed by the battering dynamic: sexual abuse, 
captivity, threats of harm, abuse of children and pets.”). 
 243. See Andrea L. Dennis & Carol E. Jordan, Encouraging Victims: 
Responding to a Recent Study of Battered Women Who Commit Crimes, 15 NEV. 
L.J. 1, 17 (2014). 
 244. See Kendall Hamilton, Comment, Virginia’s Gap Between Punishment 
and Culpability: Re-Examining Self-Defense Law and Battered Woman’s Syndrome, 
49 U. RICH. L. REV. 327, 329-30 (2014). 
 245. See Meszaros, supra note 242, at 153 (discussing how physical 
battering typically leaves traces of abuse that can be readily seen but other effects of 
abuse come in the form of an undetectable psychological trauma).  
 246. See id. (“Physiology, by definition[,] entails dynamism that could not be 
captured in a single image or scan.”).  
 247. See Krause, supra note 41, at 557-58. There are several “key elements 
of a syndrome that help[] to explain how a woman might become trapped in an 
abusive relationship, and why killing her abuser might seem a reasonable course of 
action . . . (1) a ‘tension-building’ . . . (2) the ‘acute battering incident;’ and (3) 
‘loving contrition or absence of tension.’” Id. at 558. This cycle explains learned 
helplessness, “of which ‘it becomes extraordinarily difficult for such women to 
change their cognitive set to believe their competent actions can change their life 
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designates this psychological phenomena as a type of “learned 
helplessness” established by a three-phase cycle in the abusive 
relationship.248 The cycle of abuse often creates a perception that 
imminent harm is continually present.249 
Neuroscience bolsters the credibility of BWS and provides a 
scientific explanation for this psychological phenomenon by 
explaining how cyclical battering “implicate[s] the brain’s ability to 
regulate behavior and cognitions.”250 According to one scholar, when 
a woman is in an abusive relationship the stress of the physical abuse 
accumulates, not only making the stress unmanageable, but also 
affecting the parts of the brain in control of reason and decision-
making.251 Further development and understanding of these 
neurological processes can shift the narrative of an abuse victim’s 
mere psychological delusion or syndrome into a trauma deserving of 
treatment.252  
In sum, the emerging trend toward evidence-based sentencing 
signals a scientific revolution within the criminal justice system.253 
More states are implementing evidence-based practices—indicating 
the need to amend current sentencing guidelines to reflect 
punishment as a societal institution, not punishment as an instrument 
                                                                                                       
situation.’” Id. (quoting Lenore E. Walker, Battered Women and Learned 
Helplessness, 2 VICTIMOLOGY 525, 531-32 (1978)).  
 248. See Hamilton, supra note 244, at 330-31; see also Kimberly M. Copp, 
Black Rage: The Illegitimacy of a Criminal Defense, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 205, 
219 (1995). Turk defines Battered Woman Syndrome as “[a] constellation of 
common characteristics which are manifested by women who have been abused 
physically and psychologically over a prolonged period of time by the dominant 
male in their lives.” Turk, supra note 19, at 907 (quoting Jamie Heather Sacks, A 
New Age of Understanding: Allowing Self-Defense Claims for Battered Children 
Who Kill Their Abusers, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 349, 364 (1994)).  
 249. See Turk, supra note 19, at 908.  
 250. See Meszaros, supra note 242, at 154 (discussing the severe 
psychological effects of battering).  
 251. See id. (“Within a battering relationship, the unpredictability and 
escalation of abuse places a tremendous allostatic load on the battered woman. At 
certain levels of allostatic load, the mechanism by which individuals respond to the 
next stressful event becomes dysregulated . . . The detrimental effects of stress are 
magnified when the individual feels unable to control the stressor—in this case, the 
batterer.”).  
 252. See id. at 175-76 (discussing how the courts would interpret 
neuroscience apart from the concept of BWS).  
 253. See Klingele, supra note 199, at 538-39 (discussing the surge in 
evidence-based correctional techniques and its effect on the criminal justice system).  
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of philosophy.254 Evidence-based practices have carved a pathway for 
the resurgence of rehabilitative sentencing, and as more people put 
their faith into scientific advances in technology, rehabilitation will 
thrive as an acceptable alternative to harsh punitive sentencing.255  
III. ASSESSING THE PROBLEM: ABUSE VICTIMS AND THE NEW 
REHABILITATION MODEL 
Given the obstacles abuse victims face within the justice 
system, there is no guarantee that they will escape the judge’s gavel 
unscathed.256 Some self-defense cases may be successful, but on 
average most abuse victims can face up to fifteen to twenty years in 
prison on manslaughter or murder charges.257 At best a 
nonconfrontational homicide provides the abuse victim with 
imperfect self-defense, which may lessen the murder charge to 
manslaughter but ultimately fails to acquit the abuse victim.258 As a 
means of restoring uniformity within the system, rehabilitative 
practices would provide an outlet for all offending abuse victims to 
receive the proper treatment.259 Incorporating more rehabilitative 
practices into sentencing would balance both the interests of the state 
and the victim, as it would require a specific level of detainment and 
also contribute to the healing and well-being of the abuse victim.260 
Understanding the new rehabilitation model as a larger player in 
sentencing reform for abuse victims requires assessing the failures of 
the criminal justice system to protect abuse victims,261 the 
                                                 
 254. See id. at 539 (“These new . . . practices have been promulgated at 
every level of government through both grassroots efforts and organized coalitions 
of established nonprofits seeking systemic criminal justice reform.”).  
 255. See supra notes 199, 215 and accompanying text (discussing how 
evidence-based practices have influenced the revival of rehabilitative sentencing).  
 256. See supra Part I (analyzing the inadequacy of self-defense and 
admissibility of past abuse).  
 257. See Smith, supra note 20, at 169 (discussing the average sentence for 
abuse victims). 
 258. See supra Section I.A (asserting that an immediate belief of bodily harm 
or death has been traditionally insufficient). 
 259. See supra Part II (discussing the need to amend current sentencing 
guidelines).  
 260. See supra Part II (discussing the pros and cons of the rehabilitative 
model).  
 261. See supra Section I.B (contending that the trial system has often failed 
abuse victims).  
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inadequacies of current sentencing guidelines,262 and how new 
rehabilitation practices would best serve abuse victims and provide 
them justice.263  
A. Understanding How Self-Defense and the Trial System Fail as a 
Purveyor of Justice  
Although the law is a central facet of society, it does not 
always deliver a just result. Assessing the interests of both the victim 
and the state is a necessary balancing act, but one the system fails to 
provide.264 A striking example of this concept is the inability of the 
trial system to adequately protect abuse victims.265 Seeking justice for 
the defendant becomes a Herculean task for a defense attorney as he 
or she fights to prove the defendant’s actions were justified by 
previous long-term abuse.266 Numerous cases have established that 
the fight for justice has improved but that offending abuse victims 
still face significant legal hurdles.267 Unfortunately, many of these 
cases end with the offending abuse victim serving a minimum prison 
sentence, in part because of issues with claiming imperfect or perfect 
self-defense.268 
In claiming perfect or imperfect self-defense, the issue of 
whether expert testimony of BWS will mitigate or acquit the 
offending abuse victim of the murder charge, or have no impact at all 
in the case, remains a continuous obstacle.269 Both McNeil and 
Wallace-Bey demonstrate some of the current difficulties of 
                                                 
 262. See supra Subsection II.A.1 (arguing that there is a lack a reflection of 
the individual criminal and the requisite knowledge of social values).  
 263. See supra Section II.B (proclaiming that new treatments may be 
available to alleviate criminal behavior). 
 264. See infra Part III (discussing how rehabilitation meets the desired need 
to balance the interests of both the abuse victim and the state by keeping the 
defendant confined, but also providing the necessary treatment to return the victim 
back into society). 
 265. See Kinports, supra note 41, at 409 (“In such [nonconfrontational] 
circumstances, juries convict many battered women of murder or manslaughter 
despite claims of self-defense.”).  
 266. See Burke, supra note 44, at 240-47 (explaining the difficulty in making 
BWS fit neatly into a self-defense claim by stating that it is “imperfect at best”).  
 267. See McNeil v. Middleton, 402 F.3d 920, 921-22 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 268. See Comparative Study, supra note 19, at 1.  
 269. See McNeil, 402 F.3d at 923 (Paez, J., dissenting). The dissenting judge 
illustrates how the system struggles to properly instruct juries on how to apply BWS 
evidence to perfect or imperfect self-defense. See id. He writes that this impacts the 
defendant’s right to due process. See id. 
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presenting a successful imperfect or perfect self-defense claim.270 In 
McNeil, the improper jury instructions conveyed how courts may err 
in articulating how juries are to apply BWS testimony to imperfect or 
perfect self-defense.271 These instructions are often legally complex 
and can prejudicially impact the defendant when delivered 
improperly.272 Although the Supreme Court found this error was not 
so prejudicial as to disrupt due process, the Ninth Circuit judges did 
not unanimously agree with the Court’s holding, further exposing the 
system’s flaws.273  
In a similar vein, Wallace-Bey demonstrates that BWS 
evidence may be insufficient to mitigate a murder charge.274 The 
defendant was convicted twice of second-degree murder.275 
Moreover, the fact that the defendant is now facing a third trial 
expressly portrays the inexcusable pitfalls of the trial system.276 The 
defendant was limited in her presentation of the BWS evidence; 
therefore, she was limited in effectively presenting her defense.277 
However, these two cases establish merely one aspect of how the 
trial system fails abuse victims who kill their abusers. 
Although the law of self-defense has increasingly incorporated 
mitigating evidence of abuse syndromes, the system remains an 
imperfect means of protecting abuse victims from incarceration.278 
The lack of uniformity among states means that outcomes for abuse 
victims vary depending on the state in which the nonconfrontational 
homicide occurs.279 This also concerns whether the state requires an 
objective belief of imminent harm versus an MPC jurisdiction that 
focuses on the subjectivity of the person claiming self-defense.280 
                                                 
 270. See id. at 921-22; see also Wallace-Bey v. State, 172 A.3d 1006, 1032 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2017). 
 271. Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 435, 437 (2004) (per curium) 
(stating that the last four words of the jury instruction, as a reasonable person, 
should not have been included in the jury instruction but was unlikely to have misled 
the jury).  
 272. See McNeil, 402 F.3d at 922 (majority opinion). 
 273. See id. at 923 (Paez, J., dissenting). 
 274. See Wallace-Bey, 172 A.3d at 1011-12.  
 275. Id. at 1011. 
 276. See id. at 1041. 
 277. Id. at 1019-20. 
 278. See supra Subsection I.A.2.; see also Subsection I.B.2.  
 279. See supra Section I.A.  
 280. See Kinports, supra note 41, at 409-10 (stating that majority 
jurisdictions require both a “subjective and an objective component, mandating that 
the defendant’s fear be both honest and reasonable”); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 
3.04(1) (“[T]he use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the 
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These inconsistencies of the system demonstrate that self-defense 
law alone is an insufficient means of protecting abuse victims from 
prison bars.281  
In moving against the current trend of amending self-defense to 
account for abuse victims, the most persuasive argument for 
maintaining the current legal status quo is the possible effect on self-
defense law if nonconfrontational homicides are consistently 
justified.282 Critics such as Professor Joshua Dressler maintain that 
current self-defense laws should not modify their elements to harbor 
syndromes of abuse, reasoning these syndromes are difficult to prove 
conclusively and would effectively eradicate the imminence 
requirement.283 Dressler denounces the current trend to readily 
absolve those who kill under nonconfrontational circumstances 
merely because their past experiences of abuse signal the existence 
of a possible syndrome.284 He rejects the concept that syndromes 
diminish the culpability of the defendant committing the 
nonconfrontational homicide.285  
Professor Dressler’s position may present the minority view 
among legal scholarship,286 but courts have refused self-defense 
                                                                                                       
actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting 
himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present 
occasion.”).  
 281. See supra Section I.A (discussing the failure of self-defense to 
effectively serve justice for abuse victims).  
 282. See Dressler, supra note 43, at 462-63. Dressler views BWS as a flawed 
syndrome that transforms self-defense into an excuse, not a justification. Id. at 463. 
He further argues that like an excuse, BWS focuses on the “actor’s state of mind, 
and not [] the act itself.” Id. Dressler states that assessing the reasonableness of the 
actor from the perspective of one suffering from a syndrome is illogical. Id. at 464.  
 283. See id. at 467 (“The traditional requirement of imminency—a temporal 
requirement, a relative closeness in time between the aggressor’s unlawful threat and 
the innocent person’s defensive efforts to repel it—serves an important, life-
affirming, purpose. To suggest that a battered woman should be able to kill today 
because sooner or later the batterer will inevitably kill her strikes me as 
unacceptable.”). 
 284. See id. at 464 (“In short, if BWS is permitted to support self-defense, 
the bad-old-days of the she-is-crazy burning-bed approach to battered women are 
back, albeit now disguised in more elegant justification clothing.”). 
 285. See id. at 468 (“I contend that we should not justify the Judy Normans 
who kill their tormenters in passive circumstances. To do so unduly expands the 
lawful use of deadly force to a point dangerous to the community and debilitating to 
our belief in the general sanctity of human life.”).  
 286. Some scholars disagree with Dressler’s understanding of abuse victims 
who kill. In fact, one has gone so far as to directly address an entire article to his 
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claims in cases of nonconfrontational homicide in the past.287 Other 
scholars have also voiced their skepticisms of acquitting abuse 
victims who commit homicide in nonconfrontational settings.288 A 
common criticism of allowing women to successfully claim self-
defense in these types of cases is the possibility that such behavior 
promotes a social consensus that killing a “bad” person is legally 
permissible and that self-help techniques are socially 
commendable.289 Critics reason that broadening self-defense to 
include abuse syndrome evidence may encourage such self-help 
techniques.290 It is broadly accepted that the law protects those who 
kill in self-defense, but critics assert that killing should not be the 
primary means of self-defense if other alternatives are available.291 
Even though abuse victims are resorting to self-help under 
extraordinary circumstances, such methods weaken the authority of 
the law and normalize societal violence.292 Many legal scholars 
would find this view flawed,293 but the current system only bends the 
law so far.294 With such powerful criticisms influencing the courts, 
                                                                                                       
arguments. See generally Krause, supra note 41 (asserting that Professor Dressler 
has a skewed view of abuse victims who kill their abusers).  
 287. See, e.g., State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 12 (N.C. 1989); State v. 
Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 577 (Kan. 1988). 
 288. See Rosen, supra note 37, at 50-52 (“A victim of battered woman 
syndrome, however, may be mistaken as to the true nature of her spouse’s threats on 
a particular occasion. Even if the mistake is reasonable or if there is no mistake, the 
difficulty with the calculus remains.”); see also Coughlin, supra note 51, at 90 
(stating the modifying self-defense “construes women as only partially (innately 
inadequate) responsible agents”).  
 289. See Dressler, supra note 43, at 466 (“[A] core feature of self-defense 
law is that the life of every person, even that of an aggressor, should not be 
terminated if there is a less extreme way to resolve the problem.”).  
 290. See Rosen, supra note 37, at 53 (“Relaxation of any of these strict, 
narrow requirements raises the spectre of justifying, and thus encouraging, self-
help—conduct that the law and society prefer to discourage.”).  
 291. See Rosen, supra note 37, at 53 (stating that the defense should be 
proportional and killing should only be used in circumstances with no feasible 
alternative); see also Dressler, supra note 43, at 466.  
 292. See Rosen, supra note 37, at 52 (stating that “self-help tends to diminish 
respect for the rule of law”).  
 293. See Krause, supra note 41, at 563 (“There is ample literature suggesting 
that a battered woman may in fact be accurate in predicting the imminent threat of 
such harm from a sleeping abuser.”); see also Kinports, supra note 41, at 395-96 
(asserting that self-defense laws do not need to be modified at all and battered 
women can successfully claim them).  
 294. See Dressler, supra note 43, at 464 (asserting that the elements of self-
defense cannot bend to support a battered woman’s claim; instead, the “BWS 
evidence essentially converts the battered woman’s claim from the justification of 
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abuse victims require a different avenue of sentencing to avoid the 
issues in conviction.295 
B. Inadequate Sentencing: Moving Away from Retributivism and 
Utilitarianism  
Formulating the correct legal approach for abuse victims who 
kill their abusers requires parsing the nuances and complexities of 
why society imposes certain punishments and subsequently 
reforming sentencing guidelines to properly achieve this goal.296 
Therefore, the question to ask is not whether the punishment fits the 
crime, but whether the punishment fits the criminal.297 In applying 
this question to abuse victims who kill their abusers, the law under 
principles of deterrence and retributivism determine that the 
offending abuse victim receives fifteen-plus-years’ incarceration 
because that is the punishment rightfully deserved.298 But because an 
abuse victim’s sense of rationality is deeply impaired from years of 
psychological diminution and physical battering, extreme emotional 
and cognitive trauma upon the abuse victim logically separates her 
from the class of criminals “deserving” harsh punishment.299 Abuse 
victims do not fit neatly into the theories of retributivism and 
utilitarianism because their circumstances transcend these dominant 
theories of punishment as they are not the type of criminal society 
needs to punish; they are simply not a social threat.300 
Because the theories of retributivism and utilitarianism heavily 
influence the sentencing guidelines of the American criminal justice 
                                                                                                       
self-defense to a mental incapacity defense, such as insanity or diminished 
capacity”).  
 295. See infra Section III.C (discussing how the new rehabilitation model 
will solve the issues of disparity in sentencing and the pitfalls of abuse syndromes).  
 296. See supra Section II.A.  
 297. See Apt, supra note 138, at 468.  
 298. See Clemency Project, supra note 20, at 3 (stating that on average 
women who kill their “intimates” receive a fifteen-year sentence); see also Smith, 
supra note 20, at 169 (stating that children who kill their parents may serve fifteen- 
to twenty-year sentences). 
 299. See Meszaros, supra note 242, at 154 (discussing the physical and 
physiological effects of battering).  
 300. The theories of retribution and utilitarianism focus on bringing the 
defendant his just deserts or making an example of the defendant so that it creates 
future deterrence of the crime in society. Conversely, abuse victims who kill their 
abusers act with an element of justifiable need that defies these purposes of 
punishment. See infra Part III.  
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system,301 they often leave abuse victims suffering through 
punishments neither deserved nor effective as social deterrents.302 
Since the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, many courts have used 
sentencing guidelines for these purposes—resulting in higher 
incarceration rates and harsher sentencing.303 By breaking down the 
flaws of these theories, the trend toward evidence-based corrections 
is increasingly justifiable.304  
1. Problems with Retributivism and Utilitarianism  
The movement toward evidence-based sentencing relies on 
exposing the deficiencies in the major theories of punishment 
embedded within the current Sentencing Guidelines.305 The 
Sentencing Commission formulated the Sentencing Guidelines 
absent any evidence supporting their accuracy or effectiveness;306 
instead, it based its formulation on popular data supporting the 
current practices favoring retributivist and utilitarian theories.307 But 
these theories hardly skim the surface of justifying punishment.308  
Retributivism’s most notable deficiency is failing to define 
which behavior should be regarded as reprehensible and, then, 
severely punishing the criminal behavior or immoral conduct.309 
                                                 
 301. See Jefferson-Bullock, supra note 122, at 351 (discussing how 
sentencing guidelines are primarily influenced by retributivist and utilitarian 
theories).  
 302. See Kahan, supra note 157, at 358 (implying deterrence does not work 
for actions society does not deem fit for punishment).  
 303. See Doherty, supra note 172, at 996 (discussing the Sentencing Reform 
Act as a means to amend the errors of indeterminacy by replacing the system with 
harsher and more predictable punishments).  
 304. See Klingele, supra note 199, at 551 (considering the events leading to 
the movement toward evidence-based correctional practices).  
 305. See Apt, supra note 138, at 438 (stating that most theories of 
punishment are lacking an important dimension that explains the purpose behind 
why society imposes punishment).  
 306. See Jefferson-Bullock, supra note 122, at 376 (“Surprisingly, length of 
confinement and severity of sentence was not premised on any evidence-based data, 
and ‘[n]owhere in the forest of directives that the Commission has promulgated over 
the last decade can one find a discussion of the rationale for the particular 
[sentencing] approaches.’”).  
 307. See id. at 392 (discussing how the guidelines were “informed and 
shaped by utilitarianism and retributivism”).  
 308. See supra Subsection II.A.1 (emphasizing that the theories of 
punishment do not bear all these answers to how punishment is to function).  
 309. See Apt, supra note 138, at 443 (stating that “[r]etributivism is not clear 
about how we all know which acts are reprehensible and which are not”). 
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According to Professor Richard Nygaard, society needs a clear 
philosophy for why punishment is imposed and the purposes served 
by it.310 A retributivist framework assumes the wrongdoer deserves 
the punishment solely on the basis of guilt and, therefore, takes the 
form of a “crime always equals punishment” theory.311 Under legal 
retributivism there is little justification or leniency for an abuse 
victim who commits a nonconfrontational homicide.312 In a strict 
application of retributivism, if the abuse victim has committed a 
crime, she deserves to be punished because she committed the act, 
regardless of any mitigating circumstances, such as diminished 
culpability.313  
Under utilitarianism, the purpose of punishment is to warn 
society of the consequences of unlawful actions.314 The value of these 
deterrent effects has heavily influenced the lawmakers formulating 
criminal law policy.315 However, deterrence theory is deprived of a 
deeper connection to social influences that would effectively modify 
or shape behavior.316 Criminalizing abuse victims’ homicidal actions 
against their abusers bears little deterrent value when society’s 
majority finds their behavior justifiable and the violence is an 
isolated incident.317 Although the law may not recognize a 
                                                 
 310. See Nygaard, supra note 128, at 360.  
 311. See Christopher, supra note 133, at 860 (discussing that a morally 
culpable wrongdoer “deserves, merits, or warrants punishment”); see also Apt, 
supra note 138, at 442 (stating the punishment is derived from the criminal’s 
“blameworthiness”); Nygaard, supra note 128, at 358 (stating that major punishment 
theories focus on “wrongness” and under retributivism punishment takes the form of 
revenge).  
 312. See Christopher, supra note 133, at 885-86 (differentiating between 
moral retributivism and legal retributivism, under which “punishment is justified . . . 
for those who are legally convicted of committing a criminal offense regardless of 
their moral culpability”). 
 313. See generally id. (discussing how legal retributivism justifies 
punishment even if the person committing the crime is morally innocent—meaning 
that the crime bore no inherent wrong).  
 314. See Apt, supra note 138, at 450 (“Deterrence hedges its bets on the 
hunch that, at some point, penalties become so severe that . . . they surely discourage 
the targeted crimes.”).  
 315. See Binder & Smith, supra note 144, at 956 (advocating that deterrence 
is valuable in criminal law because it will influence conduct).  
 316. See Kahan, supra note 157, at 358-60 (stating that effective deterrence 
has society’s values embedded within it because social influence is the driving force 
in modifying behavior).  
 317. See Dressler, supra note 43, at 457. Professor Dressler discusses that 
many individuals, including most of his students, find that abuse victims who kill 
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justification for killing in a nonconfrontational setting, if society 
voices that such behavior is morally justifiable, that opinion should 
be considered.318 Professor David Garland refers to society’s opinion 
as part of Durkheim’s “conscience collective”—meaning that there 
are “violations of the fundamental moral code which society holds 
sacred.”319 Therefore, deterrence cannot effectively steer abuse 
victims away from self-help techniques if society itself does not fully 
condemn such behavior.320 
Currently, sentencing guidelines are fundamentally flawed in 
their failure to account for evidence or knowledge-based 
sentencing.321 This failure to account for knowledge and empirical 
evidence in sentencing has not only failed abuse victims, but also 
contributed to an incarceration crisis.322 The flaws of sentencing 
derive from overreliance on deterrence and retributive justice.323 
However, emerging trends in evidence-based sentencing suggest that 
the system is amenable to change by considering the developments 
in modern technology giving rise to rehabilitation.324  
2. Jump-Starting Rehabilitation: Evidence-Based Sentencing 
and Criticisms  
One of determinate sentencing’s most evaluated criticisms is its 
ability to render convictions that society deems unjust.325 
                                                                                                       
their abusers in nonconfrontational settings are morally justified in their actions. See 
id. 
 318. See Gallek, supra note 10 (suggesting that 7,000 people having signed a 
petition for the release of Bresha Meadows demonstrates society’s sentiments 
toward a young girl who kills her mother’s abuser).  
 319. GARLAND, supra note 190, at 29 (discussing that society has understood 
rules that when violated deserve sanction).  
 320. See Kahan, supra note 157, at 358-59 (stating that society has the 
strongest influence on determining whether punishing behavior has any deterrent 
effect; for example “if a person is surrounded by persons who are (or appear to be) 
morally opposed to crime, she is likely to share their aversion”).  
 321. See GARLAND, supra note 190, at 280 (stating that the approach to 
understanding punishment “should be a sociology which strives to present a 
rounded, completed image; a recomposition of the fragmentary views developed by 
more narrowly focused studies”).  
 322. See Bargaric, Fischer & Wolf, supra note 171, at 787.  
 323. See id.  
 324. See Klingele, supra note 199, at 568 (“The first, and superficially most 
obvious, way to view evidence-based correctional practices is as a form of 
neorehabilitationism.”).  
 325. See Jefferson-Bullock, supra note 122, at 349-50 (stating that 
determinate sentencing is an unjust structure and should be abolished); see also Apt, 
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Determinate sentencing was instituted to resolve issues of disparate 
sentencing caused by previous indeterminate methods,326 yet it still 
manages to ineffectively distribute sentencing lengths.327 Modern 
criminal justice reformers implore judges to abandon uniform 
sentencing guidelines and consider variables of individual offenders 
based on characteristics contributing to recidivism.328 Evidence-based 
practices that are supported by empirical data and scientific research 
may soon replace the unresearched and empirically unsupported 
determinate model.329 Evidence-based sentencing techniques already 
permeate the justice system by means of “actuarial risk assessment 
instruments” used for granting bail or parole.330 It is only a matter of 
time before judges may use them to determine an abuse victim’s 
rehabilitative sentencing needs.331 
Further, evidence-based corrections signal the embrace of the 
new rehabilitation model as more practices are based on hard data 
and scientific research.332 Unlike determinate sentencing, evidence-
based sentencing reform encourages judges to evaluate the 
offender’s background and risk factors to determine sentencing 
                                                                                                       
supra note 138, at 463 (“Sentencing guidelines would be more defensible were they 
restructured to be advisory tools for analyzing a criminal’s individual rehabilitative 
needs.”).  
 326. See Jefferson-Bullock, supra note 122, at 353 (“Indeterminate 
sentencing acknowledged that it is impossible to accurately determine duration of 
incapacitation at sentencing.”).  
 327. See id. at 389 (“Oddly, the principal purpose of punishment radically 
changed while the punishment distribution tool remained unaffected.”).  
 328. See Starr, supra note 186, at 805 (discussing the emerging judicial trend 
in using evidence-based sentencing).  
 329. See Klingele, supra note 199, at 551 (stating that evidence-based 
correctional practices are those that use “research data to identify and evaluate 
successful programs”).  
 330. See id. at 552 (“In jurisdictions across the country, probation officers 
now discuss their contracts with clients in terms of ‘dosage;’ magistrates and 
correctional officers routinely employ actuarial risk assessment instruments in 
deciding whether to grant bail, often to require reporting, and whether to grant 
parole; and judges increasingly refer to defendants’ ‘criminogenic needs’ when 
imposing sentence.”) (citations omitted).  
 331. See Apt, supra note 138, at 463.  
 332. See Klingele, supra note 199, at 553-54 (stating that multi-discipline 
fields are embracing an evidence-based approach, such as nursing and psychology); 
see also Eaglin, supra note 235, at 201 (“The increased use of [evidence-based 
programs] arguably rehabilitates rehabilitation: It prevents the theory from falling 
prey to the criticisms launched against rehabilitation in the 1960s through 1970s that 
led to its national demise.”).  
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lengths.333 If judges can consider scientific evidence when assessing 
the individual’s risk of reoffending, it is more likely a judge will 
consider that a defendant abuse victim should benefit from and 
deserve rehabilitative treatment, rather than incarceration.334 
However, this new model of evidence-based sentencing raises a 
number of critiques. First, one scholar comments that this method 
favors the wrong offender.335 If the purpose of evidence-based 
sentencing is to vet the offenders who would benefit most from 
rehabilitative treatment, Professor Eaglin argues this method 
excludes the high-risk offenders who are best suited for 
rehabilitation.336 According to one study, high-risk offenders 
sustained greater treatment effects as opposed to low-risk 
offenders,337 thus demonstrating evidence-based sentencing’s 
“misguided focus.”338 Professor Eaglin argues this underinclusive 
sentencing creates a result that is not only a “cherry-picked” success 
rate, but a failure to accurately assess offender behavior.339 Although 
this criticism diminishes the credibility of the program, evidence-
based programs signal a movement toward justice—albeit an 
imperfect movement, but an improvement nonetheless.340 It allows 
for certain offenders to receive the treatment needed and provides a 
much fairer result than uniform sentencing currently offers.341 
Second, another legal scholar argues this method promotes the 
“scientific rationalization of discrimination.”342 Professor Starr urges 
                                                 
 333. See Klingele, supra note 199, at 560 (“Predicting the risk that a 
convicted person will commit future crimes and thereby endanger the community 
has long been an important piece of correctional decision making.”).  
 334. See supra notes 243-49 and accompanying text (discussing how 
physical abuse diminishes a victim’s culpability).  
 335. See Eaglin, supra note 235, at 211 (arguing that the goal of evidence-
based sentencing is flawed because it leaves out high-risk offenders).  
 336. See id. at 211-12 (discussing research that analyzes high-risk offenders 
benefiting most from rehabilitation).  
 337. See Dowden & Andrews, supra note 239, at 460. However, the study 
did not yield such results to a statistically significant degree. Id. 
 338. See Eaglin, supra note 235, at 212 (“[N]eorehabilitation stands to 
institutionalize the misguided focus on diverting only low-level, low-risk offenders 
into rehabilitation programs.”). 
 339. See id. at 213-14 (discussing how courts “cherry pick low-risk offenders 
and skim high-risk clients to boost their success rates”) (internal citations omitted). 
 340. See generally Doherty, supra note 172 (discussing the return of 
indeterminate sentencing and its positive effect on sentencing).  
 341. See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.  
 342. See Starr, supra note 186, at 805 (arguing that such practices require 
judges to determine low-risk offenders based off of socioeconomic conditions and 
may be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution).  
502 Michigan State Law Review  2018 
that using evidence-based sentencing to lower incarceration rates by 
identifying low-risk offenders is a mistake.343 Judges who rely on 
actuarial risk assessment instruments344 will determine high-risk 
offenders largely based on their socioeconomic and demographic 
statistics.345 According to Starr, the results not only end with 
disparity, but violate the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause.346 
However, most of the classifications of persons affected by risk-
assessment tools are those which would be reviewed under the 
nonsuspect standard of rational basis review because socioeconomic 
status is not considered a protected class.347 Moreover, when risk 
assessment is analyzed among a wide variety of factors, 
discrimination is not only incidental, but an unintended consequence 
of the risk-assessment.348 Thus, it is unlikely that any court would 
find that risk-assessment tools amount to constitutional violations.349 
Evidence-based practices have indicated the rise of the new 
rehabilitation model.350 Without risk-assessment tools, the courts 
would have little guidance in resolving the sentencing issues created 
                                                 
 343. See id. (discussing this method as unconstitutional).  
 344. See id. at 809. Actuarial instruments can assess offender characteristics 
and recidivism rates. See id. at 811. Starr states that these instruments “generally 
incorporate criminal history variables, such as number of past convictions, past 
incarceration sentences, and number of violent or drug convictions.” Id. 
 345. See id. at 807-08 (“EBS advocates thus often argue that judges will 
inevitably predict risk and may well rely, usually covertly, on demographic and 
socioeconomic factors.”).  
 346. See id. at 821-41 (discussing how the results will end in gender 
discrimination and wealth discrimination); see also Eaglin, supra note 235, at 214-
18 (arguing the use of evidence-based sentencing will exacerbate racial disparities as 
well). But see Hamilton, supra note 186, at 242 (discussing constitutional 
considerations of risk-assessment tools and arguing they can survive an equal 
protection analysis).  
 347. See Hamilton, supra note 186, at 244 (stating that most classifications 
would be reviewed under rational basis and a “socioeconomic class is not accorded 
any special status in equal protection”). 
 348. See id. at 263 (“There is simply no evidence that the criminologists, 
forensic scientists, policy advocates, criminal justice officials, or politicians who 
have embraced evidence-based criminal justice practices in general, and risk-needs 
assessments in particular, did so for any reason related to a discriminatory animus of 
a group subject to heightened scrutiny.”).  
 349. See id. at 285 (discussing the importance of evidence-based decisions 
and how government’s compelling reasons for creating these tools for risk-
assessment would likely overcome any constitutional challenges).  
 350. See Klingele, supra note 199, at 550-52 (discussing the promotion of 
evidence-based sentencing correlating with the rise in rehabilitation).  
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by the uniform guidelines.351 Ideological concerns garner the most 
opposition to evidence-based sentencing.352 However, the new 
rehabilitation model extends beyond ideological perspectives, as it 
now relies on hard science to achieve its goals.353 
C. The New Rehabilitation Model: Treating Abuse Victims Who Kill 
Their Abusers  
Formulating an appropriate legal response requires an intricate 
comprehension of the psychological trauma sustained by abuse 
victims—a solution that can be achieved through the new 
rehabilitation model.354 Until recently, the rehabilitation model had 
died as a viable theory of punishment.355 However, advances in 
neuroscience, pharmacology, genetics, and behavioral sciences have 
reformed the old model into a more “treatment”-oriented program, 
which would better serve abuse victims than a prison sentence.356 As 
the earlier model of rehabilitation focused on resocializing the 
criminal back into society by means such as religious counseling—
which many critics rightfully doubted—the shift toward science 
verifies that rehabilitation can work.357  
The new rehabilitation model has discarded the old methods of 
rehabilitation by implementing new techniques achieved through 
                                                 
 351. See Hamilton, supra note 186, at 284 (discussing that the current 
guidelines do not create a system of uniformity and conceding that evidence-based 
sentencing may not be perfect but still adds value to the justice system).  
 352. See id. at 273 (“More often the qualms are ideological in nature, 
drawing on the long-standing debate about the relative roles in sentencing of 
retributive, deterrence, utilitarian, and rehabilitative concerns.”).  
 353. See Ryan, supra note 132, at 305 (discussing scientific advances in 
rehabilitative practices).  
 354. See Meszaros, supra note 242, at 154 (discussing the psychological 
horrors of prolonged abuse).  
 355. Compare Nygaard, supra note 128, at 362 (stating that rehabilitation is 
no longer a viable method of criminal punishment because it failed to reduce 
recidivism rates), with Fondacaro et al., supra note 135, at 725 (demonstrating that 
rehabilitation is now experiencing a “rebirth” in the criminal justice system due to 
technological advances in the behavioral sciences).  
 356. See, e.g., Brian T.M. Mammarella, An Evidence-Based Objection to 
Retributive Justice, 16 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 289, 291 (2016) 
(discussing various scientific advancements); Ryan, supra note 132, at 272.  
 357. See Ryan, supra note 132, at 330 (“This emphasis on behavioral change 
is beginning to move rehabilitative efforts toward changing offenders’ biochemical 
compositions rather than taking the more holistic approach of transforming 
offenders’ personhoods.”). 
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scientific advances that focus on changing offender behavior.358 
These advances—shown through fields such pharmacy and 
neuroscience—indicate a renewed legal interest in the possibility of 
using rehabilitation, despite harsh criticisms.359 Neuroscience, in 
particular, indicates that rehabilitative sentencing will better serve 
abuse victims because research has formulated a scientific answer to 
how individuals respond to prolonged abuse.360 With forthcoming 
innovations in the pharmaceutical industry, behavioral sciences, and 
MRI and fMRI technology, the new rehabilitation model is better 
equipped to treat the sustained physical and physiological trauma 
endured by abuse victims.361 Further, criticisms such as funding 
expenses, practical appliance and methodologies, and permanency 
disputes do not diminish the quality of advancements and potential 
value the new rehabilitation model offers defendant abuse victims.362 
1. Abuse Victims, Diminished Culpability, and Qualifying for 
Treatment  
Before developments in neuroscience, effects of abuse 
manifested as syndromes grounded in well-attested, respectable 
psychological theories.363 Dr. Lenore Walker explained Battered 
Woman Syndrome as a three-phase cycle of violence experienced by 
the abuse victim.364 However, absent the support of scientific data, 
Dr. Walker’s theory of “learned helplessness” would remain nothing 
                                                 
 358. See id. at 264 (stating that “advances in pharmacology, genetics, and 
neuroscience have provided stunning examples of how individual’s physical 
characteristics and behaviors can be altered through treatment”).  
 359. See id. at 265.  
 360. See Meszaros, supra note 242, at 154 (discussing neurobiology and the 
general effects of battering upon brain functions).  
 361. See Eagleman, supra note 217, at 37-38 (discussing various new 
technologies emerging to help neuroscience in rehabilitation).  
 362. See Eaglin, supra note 235, at 212 (discussing rehabilitation funding 
depending largely on its success); Greely, supra note 218, at 1116-17, 1121 
(discussing the effectiveness and ethicality of new rehabilitative treatments); 
Klingele, supra note 199, at 575 (discussing whether rehabilitation will last as a 
sentencing method).  
 363. See Kinports, supra note 41, at 396 (stating that the “‘battered woman 
syndrome’ describes identifiable psychological characteristics exhibited by women 
whose husbands have physically and psychologically abused them over an extended 
period of time”).  
 364. See WALKER, supra note 63, at 55 (describing the cycles of battered 
woman syndrome).  
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more than a theory.365 Therefore, analyzing the impact of abuse 
through a neurobiological lens signals that (1) physical and 
physiological impairment causes diminished culpability in abuse 
victims366 and (2) diminished culpability renders abuse victims highly 
responsive to rehabilitative treatment.367 Although the concept of 
diminished culpability typically applies in the juvenile context,368 the 
emergence of neuroscience in the law now provides scholars and 
advocates with the arsenal of research needed to evaluate the 
diminished culpability of abuse victims.369  
In evaluating the effects of abuse, it is important to recognize 
that neuroscience research does not discredit Battered Woman 
Syndrome. It merely supplements its credibility.370 Thus, what BWS 
provided in psychological theory, neuroscience complements with 
empirical research.371 In the past, juries have been wary of abuse 
syndrome evidence—expressing their skepticism through guilty 
verdicts despite experts attesting to the victim’s abuse and its effect 
on the victim’s mental state.372 To rebut that skepticism, neuroscience 
provides a highly nuanced and scientifically grounded explanation 
corroborating abuse victims’ diminished culpability that may sway 
the court from imposing harsh sentences or, at best, persuade juries 
against returning guilty verdicts.373 
                                                 
 365. See Meszaros, supra note 242, at 131 (discussing how the syndromes 
rely on “education and media penetration to subtly massage society’s notions about 
battering and its effects”).  
 366. See id. at 161 (discussing how battering renders a victim less culpable 
of a crime).  
 367. See Fondacaro et al., supra note 135, at 716 (discussing how diminished 
culpability in juveniles makes them amenable to rehabilitation treatment).  
 368. See id. at 715. Diminished culpability is a term used for warranting 
lenient treatment for juveniles based on their immature minds. See id. at 717. 
Diminished culpability has typically been used as a mitigating factor, but 
punishment often results in harsh sentencing. See id. at 718.  
 369. See Eagleman, supra note 217, at 37 (discussing how neuroscience 
serves as “biological mitigation” in that it can assess the notion of culpability in 
offenders, particularly those who have undergone traumatic experiences); see also 
Mammarella, supra note 356, at 317 (stating that advances in science, particularly 
neuroscience, will diminish retributivism).  
 370. See Meszaros, supra note 242, at 129 (“Supplementing defense theories 
with neurobiological evidence is an incremental change that also offers the rigorous 
scientific framework commentators argue battered woman syndrome is lacking.”). 
 371. See id.  
 372. See supra Subsections I.B.1-I.B.2.  
 373. See Meszaors, supra note 242, at 145 (“When assessing the culpability 
of an individual, jurists often use the same language that a scientist or medical 
professional would use in assessing the effects of battering on an individual: 
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Decades of scholarship suggests that current law must undergo 
a substantial reform in order to fashion an appropriate legal response 
for abuse victims who kill their abusers, and scholars suggest using 
neuroscience to understand the effects of physical and psychological 
battering provides a new lens through which to understand an abuse 
victim.374 Empirical research shows diminished culpability is 
attributable to brain “defects” or damage.375 This damage can result 
through physical battering or psychological abuse.376 Most often in 
battering relationships, the brain accumulates stress hormones in 
response to the unpredictability of the abuse.377 This accumulation of 
stress impairs the abuse victim’s decision-making skills by damaging 
the prefrontal cortex of the brain,378 therefore establishing diminished 
culpability and raising questions as to an abuse victim’s 
responsibility for her actions.379 
By establishing diminished culpability, the offending abuse 
victim can present herself as an offender in need of treatment, not 
incarceration.380 Studies have suggested a correlation between abuse 
victimization and increased violence.381 However, an abuse victim’s 
proclivity to violence is arguably attributable to the side effects of 
prolonged psychological and physical abuse; therefore, any violence 
                                                                                                       
capacity, judgment, awareness. While an attorney may argue lack of judgment to 
defend an accused adolescent perpetrator, a neuroscientist would argue that an 
individual’s judgment is impaired by repeated instances of head trauma. Despite 
their shared vocabulary, there is a dearth of legal precedent merging scientific 
thought on the effects of battering with the defense of a battered woman who 
commits a crime.”).  
 374. See Smith, supra note 20, at 169.  
 375. See Meszaros, supra note 242, at 147.  
 376. See id. Physical battering often results in head injuries such as 
concussions. See id. at 148. However, physiological effects of battering are not as 
obvious and can be just as detrimental to the brain. See id. at 154.  
 377. See id. at 154-55 (explaining in medical terminology the intricate 
process of how this happens). 
 378. See id. (“Recent work has shown that chronic exposure of the brain to 
epinephrine and norepinephrine, two molecules released by the body during a 
stressful situation, can result in loss of important neuronal structures in the 
prefrontal cortex. At the same time, structures in the amygdala actually expand. This 
coupling of prefrontal diminution with amygdalar potentiation leads to impaired 
decision-making and other consequences for behavior.”).  
 379. See id. 
 380. See supra Subsection II.B.2 (explaining why establishing diminished 
culpability can allow the offending abuse victim to present herself as an offender in 
need of treatment).  
 381. See Dennis & Jordan, supra note 243, at 17 (discussing correlations 
between victimization and criminal offending).  
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on behalf of the abuse victim should be understood as a product of 
diminished culpability.382 Similar to juveniles who have presumed 
diminished culpability because of age,383 abuse victims exhibit a 
similar condition and are equally deserving of lenient sentencing.384 
Under parallel reasoning, abuse victims suffering from severe trauma 
should receive the benefits of lenient sentencing through the form of 
rehabilitative treatment.385 The most compelling reason for allowing 
abuse victims to receive rehabilitation is the new model’s 
formulation of treatment aimed toward helping those suffering from 
psychological ailments.386  
2. Emerging Treatments and Benefits for Abuse Victims  
Rehabilitation is the ideal sentencing for offending abuse 
victims because medicinal technology and therapy have developed in 
ways that will treat them effectively.387 Although many new 
rehabilitative methods concentrate specifically on treating sex 
offenders or drug addicts, other methods are developed for offenders 
suffering from psychological impairments.388 The pharmaceutical 
industry continuously releases new drugs to alleviate mental health 
disorders.389 Even though using drugs to treat mental health is a 
common practice, the pharmaceutical industry is heavily influenced 
by neurobiological developments that will aid in their efficiency and 
progress by treating the underlying pathologies, which for abuse 
victims means treatment for the underlying cogitative side effects of 
abuse.390  
Other methods include behavioral and psychotherapeutic 
interventions, which emphasize amending behavior through practices 
                                                 
 382. See Meszaros, supra note 242, at 144-45 (discussing how battering 
creates a presumption of diminished culpability). 
 383. See Fondacaro et al., supra note 135, at 716.  
 384. See id. at 717 (discussing how the “immaturity of the adolescent mind” 
has been cause for lenient sentencing).  
 385. See Meszaros, supra note 242, at 144-45 (discussing the effects of 
battering). 
 386. See Greely, supra note 218, at 1104.  
 387. See id. at 1116-17.  
 388. See Ryan, supra note 132, at 308-11.  
 389. See Greely, supra note 218, at 1106 (“Mentally ill people in the 
criminal justice system . . . have sometimes been compelled to take drugs to treat 
their mental illnesses.”).  
 390. See generally Baskin-Sommers & Fonteneau, supra note 222, at 433 
(discussing pharmacology treatments for those with mental illness).  
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of mindfulness and cognitive remediation.391 Mindfulness treatments 
remedy “anxiety, depression[,] and other psychological issues.”392 
Mindfulness behavior therapy encourages the individual to be 
“present [in the] moment,” as the activity helps reduce stress and 
increase awareness of thoughts and behavior.393 Neuroscience 
research and studies corroborate the effectiveness of this practice.394 
Cognitive remediation is a similar treatment, but it is more 
innovative as it aims specifically at the “cognitive-affective 
dysfunctions” within offenders.395 This treatment method has been 
shown to improve functioning within an area of the brain called the 
prefrontal cortex—an area described by another scholar as damaged 
by prolonged battering.396 Targeting the prefrontal cortex allows 
cognitive remediation to reverse the effects of abuse, such as 
accumulated stress and any resulting criminal tendencies that abuse 
victims often exhibit.397 Both treatments of mindfulness and 
cognitive remediation would benefit abuse victims by using neuro-
psychotherapy to abate the side effects of abuse.398 Although new 
rehabilitative treatments would largely benefit offending abuse 
victims, critics still voice their skepticisms of the new model.399  
                                                 
 391. See Fondacaro et al., supra note 135, at 724 (discussing various 
“therapeutic programs aimed at changing behavior by improving social skills and 
relationship”); see also Baskin-Sommers & Fonteneau, supra note 222, at 433-34 
(discussing neuroscience influence in mindfulness treatment).  
 392. See Baskin-Sommers & Fonteneau, supra note 222, at 434.  
 393. See id. at 433-34. 
 394. See id. at 434 (“[N]euroscience research related to mindfulness 
demonstrates that brain regions such as the anterior cingulate cortex and 
orbitofrontal cortex become more functional, and connectivity across hemispheres 
and with other important brain regions such as the amydala also may improve as a 
result of mindfulness training.”).  
 395. See id. at 434-35 (“Cognitive remediation is an approach that trains the 
brain through a targeted skill-building model that focuses on particular 
neurobiological deficits, ranging from executive function to attention to emotional 
regulation.”).  
 396. See id. at 435 (discussing how cognitive remediation improves the 
functioning of the prefrontal cortex); see also Meszaros, supra note 242, at 154-55 
(asserting that battering can result in “loss of important neuronal structures in the 
prefrontal cortex”).  
 397. See Baskin-Sommers & Fonteneau, supra note 222, at 435 
(“[C]ognitive remediation approaches offer promise for changing neural and 
behavioral patterns.”).  
 398. See id. at 434. 
 399. See Ryan, supra note 132, at 335 (evaluating the negative side effects of 
new rehabilitative treatments); see also Eaglin, supra note 235, at 210-11 
(discussing the limitations of the new rehabilitation model).  
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3. Criticisms of Using the New Rehabilitation Model for Abuse 
Victims Who Kill  
The new rehabilitation model has progressed its treatment 
programs, but critics doubt areas of the program such as funding 
expenses, ethical testing of treatments, and stability as a practice.400 
Successful rehabilitation programs rely on proper funding to 
continue their services.401 However, funding is dependent upon 
proven success of the programs, which, in turn, relies upon results 
proving these methods are effective.402 Unfortunately this creates a 
vicious cycle, as testing these new rehabilitative techniques requires 
time and willing participants in research studies.403 Although it is 
certainly harder to find participants for more invasive treatments, 
such as psychosurgeries,404 testing for new pharmaceutical drugs 
poses its own difficulties in proving safety and efficacy.405 
Accordingly, nonhuman research—research performed exclusively 
on animals—does not provide sufficient evidence of how humans 
react to the same treatments.406 Thus, issues in proving safety and 
efficacy subsequently impede the progression of treatments, which 
may affect the lasting use of rehabilitative programs.407 One scholar 
warns that the new rehabilitation model is a fleeting trend—as it has 
proven to be in the past.408 As rehabilitation continues to implement 
                                                 
 400. See Eaglin, supra note 235, at 212-14 (discussing rehabilitation funding 
depending largely on its success); Greely, supra note 218, at 1116-17 (discussing the 
effectiveness and ethicality of new rehabilitative treatments); Klingele, supra note 
199, at 575-76 (discussing whether rehabilitation will last as a sentencing method).  
 401. See Eaglin, supra note 235, at 212 (“Where the funding for programs 
depends on proven success, there is less room for additional expenses.”).  
 402. See id. at 212-13. 
 403. See Greely, supra note 218, at 1116-17 (asserting that “[t]he criminal 
justice system should not directly intervene in people’s brains unless the 
intervention has been proven safe and effective”).  
 404. See id. at 1123 (stating that it is “highly unlikely that healthy volunteers 
would be willing to undergo psychosurgery, with its consequent destruction of parts 
of their brains, to test the procedure’s safety”).  
 405. See id. at 1121 (arguing that there are “practical and ethical difficulties 
of finding volunteers for clinical trials to test prevention of criminal behavior, as 
well as the political risks such trials pose”). 
 406. See id. at 1121-22 (stating these treatment methods may be comparable 
but are ultimately inconclusive).  
 407. See Klingele, supra note 199, at 575-76 (discussing whether 
rehabilitation will last as a sentencing method). 
 408. See id. at 575 (“[I]t is easy to forget that some of the scientific tools in 
which neorehabilitionalists place so much stock are not that far removed from the 
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scientifically advanced treatments, these treatment methods are 
under pressure to yield successful results or the entire institution may 
crumble.409  
However, these criticisms should not deter researchers and 
rehabilitative enthusiasts from striving to improve the system.410 New 
rehabilitative practices offer better alternatives for abuse victims who 
kill their abusers and do not receive an acquittal.411 It is a far more 
productive alternative than an incarceration sentence—in which 
defendant abuse victims would receive little to no treatment.412 
Despite drawbacks to the system, abuse victims deserve the benefits 
provided by new innovative treatments.413 
CONCLUSION 
In cases where abuse victims kill their abusers under 
nonconfrontational circumstances, the legal system offers no 
guarantee that they will be acquitted of the murder or manslaughter 
charges.414 The law has progressed to allow syndrome evidence as a 
mitigating factor, but presenting evidence of the abuse in court does 
not promise a lenient sentence, and severity in sentencing varies 
across states and between judges.415 The current flaws in sentencing 
guidelines contribute to harsher punishments for offending abuse 
victims as these guidelines are influenced by theories of punishment, 
which primarily aim to impose punitive, rather than restorative, 
sentences.416  
However, offending abuse victims who do not receive an 
acquittal now have a safety net.417 If the trial system fails, the new 
                                                                                                       
now-discredited science that rehabilitationalists promulgated less than a century 
ago.”).  
 409. See id. at 576.  
 410. See supra notes 358-59 and accompanying text (detailing the ways the 
new rehabilitation mode is progressing).  
 411. See supra notes 387-99 and accompanying text (explaining the various 
innovations in rehabilitative practices that would help abuse victims). 
 412. See Clemency Project, supra note 20 (discussing how battered women 
who kill are sentenced an average of fifteen years in prison). 
 413. See supra notes 358-60 and accompanying text.  
 414. See supra Sections I.A-B.  
 415. See Clemency Project, supra note 20 (discussing how two different 
cases presented in the same state involving women who kill their husbands received 
different sentences; one woman received eighteen months whereas another woman 
received three years). 
 416. See supra Section II.A. 
 417. See supra Subsection II.B.1.a. 
 Abuse Victims Who Kill 511 
rehabilitation model allows for proper treatment to be incorporated 
into sentencing.418 In light of modern scientific advancements, 
rehabilitation has risen from the ashes to revolutionize the way the 
criminal justice system imposes punishment.419 The new 
rehabilitation model will utilize neuroscience, pharmaceutical, and 
behavioral treatment methods to remedy the effects of prolonged 
abuse and return the abuse victim to society.420 As more scientific 
data emerges, these rehabilitative programs will continue to improve 
and prevail as viable sentencing for this type of offender.421 Abuse 
victims who kill their abusers may not always receive the justice they 
deserve, but the criminal justice system, at the very least, owes them 
guaranteed treatment.422  
 
                                                 
 418. See supra Subsection III.C.2. 
 419. See supra Subsection II.B.1.a. 
 420. See supra Subsection II.B.1.a. 
 421. See supra Subsection II.B.1.  
 422. See supra Part III.  
